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Dear readers,
I am very pleased to provide you with the 58th edition of 
the ESARDA Bulletin.
As this year marks the 50th anniversary of ESARDA, the 
Editorial Committee has dedicated the cover of the journal 
to this important event. Nevertheless, the new cover layout 
is not the only novelty introduced by the Editorial Commit-
tee. In order to stimulate the scientific debate and encour-
age the information exchange in the ESARDA community, 
we have also introduced a journal subtitle to emphasize 
the scientific essence of our publication: The International 
Journal of Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation.
The ESARDA Bulletin was born in October 1981 as a bulle-
tin dispatching news about ESARDA working group activi-
ties and presenting Safeguards relevant technical articles. 
In time, the section related to articles expanded in quantity 
and quality, and from February 2006, with the Issue 33, 
the ESARDA Bulletin contains a section dedicated to sci-
entific peer-reviewed articles. The ESARDA Bulletin con-
tent continued to evolve according to the needs of the ES-
ARDA community and the peer-reviewed articles section 
expanded more and more. Currently, the Bulletin is entirely 
dedicated to the publication of scientific-peer reviewed ar-
ticles and has become the scientific journal of ESARDA. 
Because of that, in January 2019, the Editor, on behalf of 
the Editorial Committee, has resubmitted to Scopus its re-
quest for indexation in their academic database of publica-
tions: we should have an answer by the end of the year.
In ESARDA, it is also important that all the members are up-
dated on ESARDA Working group progresses and on news 
relating to Safeguards and Non-proliferation tools and train-
ings that cannot be described in a scientific article. The Edi-
torial Committee has then setup a new online publication 
that aims at reporting news from the ESARDA working 
groups and technical papers that are relevant for the ESAR-
DA community. The first Issue of the new ESARDA publica-
tion is expected for September 2019 and issues will be re-
leased every 6 months: in the due time the ESARDA web 
site will host a section dedicated to the new publication.
On April 1-5, 2019 the Joint Research Centre hosted the 
18th edition of the ESARDA Course on Nuclear Safeguards 
and Non-Proliferation. The course was successfully at-
tended by 50 enthusiastic participants from Europe, 
America, Asia and Africa. People interested in participating 
to the 19th ESARDA course, foreseen in spring 2020, is in-
vited to visit the dedicated section in the ESARDA website 
that will be updated after the summer break.
On May 14-16, 2019 the 41st ESARDA Annual Meeting 
Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Manage-
ment, has been held at the Regina Palace Hotel in Stresa, 
preceded by the ESARDA working groups meetings. The 
Symposium, based on about 150 scientific, technical and 
strategic presentations, was a big success followed by 
more than 250 participants from all over the world. The 
proceedings will be published soon in the dedicated sec-
tion of the ESARDA website.
On behalf of the Editorial Committee, I would like to thank 
authors and reviewers for the time and energy they have 
dedicated to write, review and improve the published scien-
tific works, allowing the publishing in the current Bulletin of 
high quality articles that are of great interest to ESARDA.
I encourage researchers to submit their work any time so 
that all the ESARDA community can benefit from the latest 
relevant research novelties. In order to submit a contribu-
tion you are kindly asked to follow the instructions reported 
in the bulletin section of the ESARDA web site at https://
esarda.jrc.ec.europa.eu.
Moreover, I would like to encourage volunteering as poten-
tial reviewer by sending an e-mail to EC-ESARDA-BULLE-
TIN@ec.europa.eu, specifying one’s area of expertise 
among the following:
• Non-destructive analysis
• Destructive analysis
• Arms control and Nuclear Disarmament Verification
• Geological repositories
• Spent Fuel Verification and Spent Fuel Transfer
• Containment & Surveillance
• Process Monitoring
• Statistical Methodologies
• Implementation of Safeguards
• Safeguards Methodologies
• Nuclear Security
• Export control and Non-Proliferation
Editorial
Elena Stringa
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 58, June 2019
2
I also encourage you to cite works published in the ESAR-
DA Bulletin, in order to increase the visibility and interest 
on ESARDA activities.
As always, on behalf of the Editorial Committee, I conclude 
this editorial addressing sincere thanks to Andrea De Luca, 
web master and essential assistant for the ESARDA publi-
cations preparation: thank you very much for your engage-
ment and enthusiasm, for the pertinent suggestions and 
fruitful ideas in supporting the dissemination of knowledge 
in the ESARDA community.
Dr. Elena Stringa
Editor of the ESARDA Bulletin - The International Journal 
of Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Safeguards
https://esarda.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
ec-esarda-bulletin@ec.europa.eu
Elena.Stringa@.ec.europa.eu
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Optimal Sampling Plans for Inventory Verification 
of Spent Fuel Ponds
Thomas Krieger1, Katharina Aymanns1, Arnold Rezniczek2, Irmgard Niemeyer1
1Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, IEK-6, 52425 Jülich, Germany 
2UBA GmbH, 52134 Herzogenrath, Germany
E-mail: t.krieger@fz-juelich.de, k.aymanns@fz-juelich.de, Rezniczek@uba-gmbh.de, i.niemeyer@fz-juelich.de
Abstract:
Spent fuel unloaded from the reactor core of Light Water 
Reactors is usually stored in the spent fuel pond of the 
reactor. The IAEA and EURATOM have a  number of 
dif ferent instruments in their verification instrument 
portfolios to verify spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel 
pond. Depending on the situation, e.g., the type of the 
different fuel assemblies’ strata and the accessibility for 
future re-verification, dif ferent requirements for the 
verification exist.
Once spent fuel has been loaded into dry storage casks 
for transport and intermediate storage, it becomes difficult-
to-access. The IAEA requires that nuclear material prior to 
its becoming difficult-to-access must be verified using 
sampling plans that provide a high detection probability for 
a possible diversion of nuclear material from the spent fuel 
assemblies.
The paper discusses how to set up optimal sampling plans 
depending on the verification instruments, the assumed 
detection capabilities of these verification instruments, and 
the presumed diversion strategies.
Keywords: sampling plans; detection probability; invento-
ry verification; spent fuel ponds; difficult-to-access;
1. Introduction
Spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) from Light Water Reactors 
(LWRs) are usually stored in the spent fuel pond of the re-
actor. Typically, physical inventory verification (PIV), interim 
inspections or inspections to verify the transfers of spent 
fuel to dry storage, where the spent fuel is no longer ac-
cessible for verification, are carried out. As especially the 
verification of spent fuel prior to transfers to dry storage re-
quire a high detection probability (DP) for possible diver-
sions and therefore also a substantial amount of inspec-
tion effort, IAEA and EURATOM aim to optimize the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these verifications.
The IAEA and EURATOM have a set of instruments that 
can be used for the verification of spent fuel assemblies. In 
this paper we focus on the following three instruments: 
The Improved Cerenkov Viewing Device (ICVD), the Digital 
Cerenkov Viewing Device (DCVD), and the Passive 
Gamma Emission Tomography System (PGET). Each of 
these verification instruments has an associated detection 
capability and specific time to perform a measurement. 
Depending on different diversion assumptions and nuclear 
material strata, optimal sampling plans can be set up 
based on the different characteristics of the verification 
instruments.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces 
the verification instruments together with their detection 
capabilities and the types of LWR assemblies considered 
in this paper. Also, the estimated net measurement time to 
carry out the measurements for an experienced and inex-
perienced inspector for any of the three instruments is giv-
en. Section 3 deals with the probabilistic aspects for find-
ing optimal sampling plans where approaches from [1], [2] 
and [3] are modified and tailored to the situation discussed 
here. In section 4 optimal sampling plans are determined 
for four examples where two types of LWR assemblies 
and two different required detection probabilities are as-
sumed. Section 5 deals with non-equal diversion scenari-
os which are usually not addressed in common safe-
guards literature. It is shown that the achieved DP depends 
on the order the sampling is performed. In section 6 the 
case of two classes of SFAs in one spent fuel pond is 
treated and issues in finding optimal sampling plans are 
discussed. Section 7 contains the derivations of the DP 
formula and section 8 points to future research activities 
and gives an outlook.
2. Instruments for verification of spent fuel 
assemblies
In this paper we assume that the inventory of the spent 
fuel pond does not increase, which would be, e.g., the 
case after the final shutdown of the reactor. In this situation 
we consider applying the ICVD, the DCVD or the PGET to 
verify the content of the spent fuel pond. This section de-
scribes briefly the function and use of the three measure-
ment instruments.
2.1 ICVD and DCVD
Both the ICVD and DCVD are inspector tools imaging the 
Cerenkov light emitted from irradiated nuclear fuel assem-
blies in spent fuel ponds as described in [4], [5], [6].
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The ICVD and DCVD systems have been approved by the 
IAEA for gross defect verification in order to verify the 
presence of spent fuel. They both observe the Cerenkov 
light glow from above a storage pool. They are optimized 
for ultraviolet radiation and are capable of operating with 
facility lights turned on. When aligned vertically above the 
tops of fuel assemblies the verification instruments can 
distinguish irradiated fuel items from non-fuel items.
The ICVD is used for the qualitative verification (Yes/No 
decision) of irradiated nuclear fuel stored under water. It al-
lows the inspectors to conclude that the observed object 
is an irradiated fuel assembly. ICVD does not allow record-
ing the measurement results for further investigation. In 
case of inconclusiveness of the measurement results the 
measurement has to be repeated on-site.
The DCVD is further approved by the IAEA to detect partial 
defects. The camera is connected to a computer that uses 
specialized software to analyse the image. To carry out the 
measurements of SFAs stored in a pond the DCVD has to 
be placed at the fuel assembly-loading machine. Based on 
experiences a DCVD measurement campaign of spent fuel 
assemblies stored underwater may take up to one week 
depending on the number of SFAs to be verified.
In general, ICVD and DCVD have a minor impairment on 
the facility operation as there is no need for fuel movement 
or contact of the instrument with the potentially contami-
nated water of the spent fuel pond.
2.2 PGET
The PGET is approved by the IAEA for verification of spent 
nuclear fuel assemblies stored under water; see [7]. Fis-
sion products contained in SFAs emit gamma radiation, 
which is detected by two collimated CdZnTe detectors. 
The PGET system is assembled on a rotary baseplate in-
side a watertight torus shaped enclosure. To carry out the 
verification measurements the system is positioned under 
water on the top of an empty rack or on a special tripod on 
the bottom of the pond. In a next step a SFA is moved and 
placed in the center of the enclosure and held stationary to 
perform a measurement. Thus, compared to the ICVD and 
DCVD additional time to place the SFA in the PGET is 
needed.
2.3 LWR assemblies and detection capabilities 
of ICVD, DCVD and PGET
This paper considers two different types of LWR spent fuel 
such as fuel assemblies from pressurized water reactors 
(PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR); see, e.g., [8]. 
PWRs are operated with fuel assemblies based on 
a square lattice arrangement characterized by the number 
of rods they contain, typically, 17  17 in current designs 
with for example 250 fuel pins per assembly. BWRs also 
use fuel assemblies, which are designed as a square lat-
tice, with rods geometries ranging from 6  6 to 10  10 
containing for example 96 fuel pins.
Each of the three verification measurement instruments 
has an associated detection capability: What is the proba-
bility (the so-called identification probability pinstrument ) that 
the instrument will identify a falsified SFA as falsified, if 
a certain percentage of material has been removed from 
the SFA (defect size)? According to [9], the identification 
probabilities can be assumed to be step functions taking 
values zero and one:
 
p
p
ICVD =

%1 100
0
if  of the pins have been removed
otherwise
DCVD =
%1 30
0
if  of the pins or more have been removed
otherwise
if  of the pins or more have been remov

=pPGET
. %1 0 38 ed
otherwise0

 (1)
Six comments: First, the identification probabilities in 
Eq. (1) are based on field trials on multiple fuel types for 
a range of burnups, cooling times, and number of SFAs 
measured; see [9]. Second, Eq.  (1) indicates that the 
measurement errors are not normally distributed, as it is 
usually assumed; see [3]. Third, more complex identifica-
tion probabilities than in Eq.  (1) could be considered if 
needed. The approach in this paper, however, would have 
to be modified. Fourth, Eq. (1) quantifies for our purposes 
the terms gross, partial and bias defect which are usually 
defined only qualitatively; see 10.7 in [6]. Fifth, because 
most of the modern LWR assembly designs allow for the 
exchange of single fuel pins for defective rods, Eq. (1) cov-
ers the diversion of single pins. Sixth, a replacement of 
pins with dummy pins, which contain material leading to 
a similar signal as a spent fuel pin, is not considered in this 
paper.
Estimates of the net measurement time for one SFA for 
any of the three instruments are listed in Table 1, based on 
personal communication [10]. Note that the set-up time for 
all three instruments is equal concerning the positioning of 
the fuel element handling machine; in addition, PGET re-
quires 2 more minutes for the SFA placement.
ICVD DCVD PGET
experienced 
inspector
3 seconds 1 minute
5 minutes 
measurement plus 
2 minutes 
placement 
procedure of the 
SFA into the PGET
inexperienced 
inspector
7 seconds 2 minute
Table 1: Estimated net measurement times for an experience/
inexperienced inspector for the three instruments.
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Recent experiences show, that the DCVD net measure-
ment time of an experienced inspector is about 2 minutes 
per SFA instead of 1 minute depending, e.g., on the quality 
of water, the pond conditions, the light-contrast of the im-
age, and the burnup of the SFAs.
3. One class of SFAs: The detection probability
This section deals with the probabilistic aspects for finding 
optimal sampling plans, where approaches from [1], [2] and 
[3] are modified and tailored to the situation discussed here.
Let N be the number of SFAs in the spent fuel pond, L be 
the number of fuel pins per SFA, x Pu  be the average 
amount of plutonium (Pu) per SFA, and SQ be the signifi-
cant quantity (SQ = 8 [kg] for Pu), i.e. “the approximate 
amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of man-
ufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”; 
see 3.14 in [6]. We focus in this paper on the diversion of 
Pu, because it should be more attractive to a diverter than 
low enriched uranium, as low enriched uranium 1) requires 
additional enrichment to become weapon usable material 
and 2) the number of fuel pins to be removed to get a sig-
nificant quantity of 75 [kg] is usually much higher compared 
to acquiring a significant quantity of 8 [kg] for Pu.
IAEA sampling plans are usually based on the equal diver-
sion hypothesis (see [3]) which means that each falsified 
item is falsified by the same amount of nuclear material. In 
the context discussed here, this hypothesis means that the 
diverter removes rpin pins from a certain number of SFAs 
(items). For example: 10 pins are removed from 20 SFAs, 
but not: 4 pins are removed from 21 SFAs and 30 pins from 
10 SFAs (see section 5). The number rpin ranges from the 
smallest possible number of removed pins rmin (defined be-
low) up to the maximum number of removed pins L.
How many SFAs have to be falsified if rpin pins are removed 
from each of them? Because the diverter wants to acquire 
one significant quantity (1 SQ), rpin and the respective number 
of falsified SFAs r r rSFA SFA pin= ( ) have to fulfil the inequality
x
L
r r r SQPu pin SFA pin× × ( ) ≥ ,
which yields, assuming that the diverter will not falsify 
more SFAs than necessary,
 r r
SQ L
rxSFA pin Pu pin
( ) = ×





,
1
 (2)
where the ceiling a  of a real number a is the smallest inte-
ger not less than a. Because the number of falsified SFAs 
must be smaller or equal than the total number of SFAs of 
the spent fuel pond, i.e. r r NSFA pin( ) ≤  for all admissible rpin, 
the minimum number of removed pins rmin is, using Eq. (2), 
the smallest integer fulfilling SQ L r Nx Pu min×  ≤/ / , i.e.
r
SQ L
Nxmin Pu
=
×


 .
Because it is assumed that the diverter can acquire 
1 SQ  from the SFAs in the spent fuel pond, we must 
have  SQ Nx Pu≤ ,  wh ich  y i e lds ,  us ing  Eq.   (2), 
r L SQ x N NSFA Pu( ) =   ≤   =/ , i.e. the existence of rmin 
can be assured. Therefore, the set of diversion strategies 
is assumed to be
 X r r Lmin min: , , , ,= + …{ }1  (3)
and r rSFA pin( ) according to Eq. (2) defines for any r Xpin ∈  
the number of falsified SFAs. Eq. (2) is illustrated in Table 2 
for L = 96, x Pu = 2 [kg] and SQ = 8 [kg] yielding rmin = 1 if 
N ≥ 384.
Table 2 illustrates two effects: First, different rpin values may 
lead to the same number of falsified SFAs. Thus, a rational 
diverter removes 1, 2, …, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 35, 39, 
43, 48, 55, 64, 77 or 96 pins, or in general:
fo
X
r X r r r r
r r L
pin SFA pin SFA pin
pin min
 :
:
,
=
∈ −( ) > ( )
= + …

 1
1r all





.
Because of the properties of the DP as a function of rpin 
(see below), only the three values r L L Lpin ∈   − −{ }0 3 1 1. , ,  
need to be considered for f inding an appropriate 
rpin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
r rSFA pin( ) 384 192 128 96 77 64 55 48 43 39 35 32 30 28
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24,25 26,27 28,29 30,31 32,33,34
26 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12
35…38 39…42 43…47 48…54 55…63 64…76 77…95 96
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4
Table 2: Pairs r r rpin SFA pin, ( )( ) that achieve 1 SQ = 8 [kg].
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verification sampling plan; the specific nature of the set of 
diversion strategies does not matter and thus, we use the 
set X  (not X) as set of diversion strategies. Second, not 
any number rSFA (e.g., r rSFA pin( ) = 25) can be achieved un-
der the equal diversion hypothesis and the pin removal 
scenario.
Let p rinstrument pin( ) be the instruments’ identification proba-
bility in case rpin pins are removed from an SFA. Then 
Eq. (1) yields for all L ≤ 100 / 0.38 = 263
 
p r
for r L
for r L
p r
fo
ICVD pin
pin
pin
DCVD pin
( ) = =≤ ≤ −

( ) =
1
0 1 1
1 r L r L
for r L
p r
pin
pin
PGET pin
0 3
0 1 0 3 1
1
.
.
  ≤ ≤
≤ ≤   −



( ) = .for r Lpin1≤ ≤
 (4)
Sampling plans are usually based on the DP. In the con-
text analysed in this paper we are interested in the detec-
tion of the diversion of 1 SQ of Pu from the spent fuel 
pond by performing item by item tests. This means here 
that the number of reported pins in an SFA is compared 
to the number of identified pins in that SFA. For that pur-
pose, the inspector verifies n1 SFAs with the ICVD, n2 with 
the DCVD, and n3 with the PGET, where per verified SFA 
only one measurement instrument is applied. Using the 
probability mass function of a hypergeometric distributed 
random variable, see, e.g., [1] or [11], the detection proba-
bility DP N n n n rpin, , , ,1 2 3( ) is, using Eq. (4), given by
DP N n n n r
N r r
n
N
n
for r
pin
SFA pin
, , , ,
( )
mi
1 2 3
3
3
1
( ) =
−
−







n .
( )
≤ ≤   −
−
−
+




+




r L
N r r
n n
N
n n
for
pin
SFA pin
0 3 1
1 2 3
2 3
0 3 1
1 1 2 3
1 2 3
.
( )
L r L
N r r
n n n
N
n n n
pin
SFA pin
  ≤ ≤ −
−
−
+ +




+ +




=





for r Lpin ,
 (5)
keeping in mind that 
a
b



 =: 0 for b > a where a and b are 
integers, and where r rSFA pin( ) is given by Eq. (2). The deri-
vation of Eq. (5) is done in section 7. Note that because the 
identification capability of the measurement instruments is 
modelled as a Yes/No decision, i.e. an attribute test is per-
formed, the DP degenerates to a selection probability. 
Nevertheless, we still call the expression in Eq. (5) DP be-
cause this term is commonly used; see [3] for a detailed 
discussion. Also note, that in the three regions of rpin-val-
ues in Eq. (5) only the numbers ni are utilized for which the 
respective measurement instrument(s) yield(s) the identifi-
cation probability of one.
We seek for a sampling plan (n1, n2, n3) that achieves the 
required DP 1− βreq  (set by the IAEA and/or EURATOM) in-
dependent of the actual diversion strategy, i.e.
 DP N n n n r r Xpin req pin, , , , .1 2 3 1( ) ≥ − ∈β for all  (6)
A sampling plan is called optimal, if it fulfils inequality (6), 
and if it minimizes the number of SFAs to be verified with 
the most expensive/time-consuming method (i.e. n3), then 
minimizes the number of SFAs to be verified with the sec-
ond most expensive/time-consuming method (i.e. n2), and 
finally, minimizes the number of SFAs to be verified with 
the least expensive/time-consuming method (i.e. n1), i.e. 
the lexicographic optimization criterion is applied; see [12].
Because the DP as defined by Eq. (5) is a monotone de-
creas ing funct ion of rpin,  i .e.  DP N n n n rpin, , , ,1 2 3( ) ≥ 
DP N n n n rpin, , , ,1 2 3 1+( ) for rpin and rpin + 1 from the same 
region, inequality (6) has to be valid for the three values 
r L L Lpin ∈   − −{ }0 3 1 1. , , .  Thus,  the  samp l ing  p lan 
(n1, n2, n3) achieves the required DP 1− βreq if and only if
max
( . )
,
( )N r L
n
N
n
N r L
n n
SFA SFA
−   −







− −
+
0 3 1 1
3
3
2 3


+




−
+ +




+ +





N
n n
N r L
n n n
N
n n n
SFA
2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
,
( )









≤ βreq .
 (7)
Because for any N, any 1 ≤ r < N and any 1 ≤ r ≤ N – r we 
have, see, e.g., [1] or [3],
N r
n
N
n
n
N j
n
Nj
r
j
r
−







= −
−



 ≤ −



 =
=
−
=
−
∏ ∏
0
1
0
1
1 1 1−


n
N
r
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r L
req
r LSFA SFA
3
0 3 1
2
11 1= −( ) = −( )   − −β β( . ) ( ),  
 
−
= −( ) − +( )
n
n N n nreqr LSFA
3
1 3 21 β( )
 (8)
fulfils inequality (7) where r rSFA pin( ) is given by Eq. (2). Note 
that the sampling plan given by Eq. (8) does not need to 
be optimal because it may overestimate the sample size 
by up to 3 SFAs (this is a general result in the attribute 
sampling context; see [13]).
4. One class of SFAs: Examples
In this section optimal sampling plans are determined for 
the examples in Table 3 where we vary 1) the required DP 
of 0.5 and 0.9 (first column), and 2) the type of SFAs in the 
spent fuel pond (BWR and PWR; first row). All other entries 
in Table 3 are explained in the course of this section.
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For a detailed discussion, we consider the BWR – 90 % ex-
ample: The spent fuel pond contains N = 2500 BWR SFAs, 
each having L = 96 fuel pins and an average amount 
x Pu = 2 [kg] of Pu per SFA. Table 4 illustrates in the first 
and second row the pairs r r rpin SFA pin, ( )( )  that achieve 
1 SQ = 8 [kg] of Pu, where r rSFA pin( ) is given by Eq. (2). The 
third to fifth row represents the instruments’ identification 
probability according to Eq. (4).
Table 4 demonstrates that in case of a bias defect (i.e. only 
small numbers of removed pins) only the PGET is capable 
to identify a falsified SFA as falsified, whereas only in case 
of a gross defect (all pins are removed) all instruments lead 
to the identification probability one.
For illustration, consider the sampling plan  (n1, n2, n3) = 
(10,65,25). Figure  1 shows the achieved DP given by 
Eq. (5) as a function of the number rpin of removed pins. 
The two vertical lines divide the graph into three regions: in 
the left region (1 ≤ rpin ≤ 28) only the PGET is capable to 
identify a  falsified SFA as falsified, in the middle region 
(29 ≤ rpin ≤ 95) both the PGET and the DCVD are capable 
to identify a falsified SFA as falsified, and only in the right 
region (rpin = L = 96) all three instruments are successful in 
identifying a falsified SFA as falsified.
Figure 1: Achieved DP for the sampling plan 
(n1, n2, n3) = (10, 65, 25).
Three comments on Figure 1:
First, the sampling plan (n1, n2, n3) = (10,65,25) achieves 
a DP of about 0.1315 (horizontal dots) independent of the 
actual diversion strategy because the minimum of 
DP N n n n rpin, , , ,1 2 3( )  is attained at rpin = 28, and we obtain, 
using Eq. (5), that DP N n n n, , , , .1 2 3 28 0 1315( ) ≈ .
Second, the DP curve is a monotone (but not strictly) de-
creasing function of rpin  in the regions rpin = 1, …, 28 and 
BWR, N = 2500, L = 96, x Pu = 2 PWR, N = 500, L = 250, x Pu = 9
1 0 5− =βreq .
ICVD: 74
DCVD: 203
PGET: 121
experienced: 17 hours
inexperienced: 21 hours
ICVD: 0
DCVD: 170
PGET: 80
experienced: 12 hours
inexperienced: 15 hours
1 0 9− =βreq .
ICVD: 172
DCVD: 543
PGET: 379
experienced: 53 hours
inexperienced: 62 hours
ICDV: 0
DCVD: 231
PGET: 219
experienced: 29 hours
inexperienced: 33 hours
Table 3: Examples.
rpin 1 2 … 28 29 30 … 95 96
r rSFA pin( ) 384 192 … 14 14 13 … 5 4
p rICVD pin( )
0
0
1p rDCVD pin( )
1
p rPGET pin( ) 1
Table 4: Pairs r r rpin SFA pin, ( )( ) that achieve 1 SQ = 8 [kg] and the identification probabilities as a function of the number rpin of removed pins.
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rpin = 29, …, 95, respectively. This result is plausible, be-
cause with an increasing number of removed pins the 
number of falsified SFAs in the pond decreases (i.e. 
r r r rSFA pin SFA pin( ) ≥ +( )1 ), and thus, the probability to select 
at least one falsified SFA when r rSFA pin( ) are in the pond is 
greater or equal than the probability to select at least one 
falsified SFA when r rSFA pin +( )1  are in the pond.
Third, the value of the DP is constant, e.g., for all num-
bers rpin = 48, …,54, because they lead to the same num-
ber of falsified SFAs (r rSFA SFA48 54 8( ) =…= ( ) = , see Ta-
ble 2) and because in that region both the PGET and the 
DCVD are capable to identify a falsified SFA as falsified. 
In contrast, although r rSFA SFA28 29 14( ) = ( ) =  we see that 
DP N n n n, , , ,1 2 3 28( ) < DP N n n n, , , ,1 2 3 29( ) , because in case 
rpin = 29 both the PGET and the DCVD are being used 
and n2 > 0.
Suppose the inspector wants to achieve a required DP of 
(say) 0.9. How many SFAs does he need to verify? Eq. (8) 
implies that the sampling plan (n1, n2, n3) = (172,543,380) 
achieves a DP of 0.9, i.e. at least 380 SFAs must be veri-
fied by the PGET. This sampling plan, however, is not opti-
mal in the sense defined after inequality (6), because the 
number of PGET measurements can be reduced to 379 
and the sampling plan (172,543,379) still achieves a DP of 
0.9. This illustrates that the sampling plan given by Eq. (8) 
does not have to be optimal (see also the comment at the 
end of section 3). Using the net measurement times from 
Table 1, we see that an experienced inspector needs 
about 53 hours net measurement time, while an inexperi-
enced one needs about 62 hours (times are rounded 
down to full hours). Both measurement times are unrealis-
tic and thus, the optimal sampling plan (172,543,379) may 
be infeasible in practice. The results of the BWR-90% ex-
ample are summarized in the respective field in Table 3.
The optimal sampling plans for the remaining examples in 
Table 3 can be obtained in the same way. Therefore, we 
just make two comments: First, the identification probabili-
ties for the PWR examples are, using Eq. (4),
p r
for r
for r
p r
ICVD pin
pin
pin
DCVD pin
( ) = =≤ ≤

( ) =
1 250
0 1 249
1 for r
for r
p r for r
pin
pin
PGET pin pin
75 250
0 1 74
1 1
≤ ≤
≤ ≤

( ) = ≤ ≤ 250.
Second, because Eq. (2) implies r rSFA SFA249 250 1( ) = ( ) = , 
the requirement DP N n n n req, , , ,1 2 3 95 1( ) ≥ − β  impl ies 
DP N n n n req, , , ,1 2 3 96 1( ) ≥ − β  for any n1 ≥ 0, and thus, there 
is no need to perform any ICVD measurement.
It has to be emphasized that the optimal sampling plans in 
Table 3 highly depend on the definition of the identification 
probabilities given by Eqs. (1) and (4).
To further illustrate the approach of section 3, we discuss 
two topics. First, we determine the optimal sampling plan if 
either “PGET and ICVD” (case 1) or “PGET and DCVD” 
(case 2) can be applied. Consider a spent fuel pond with 
N = 2000 BWR SFAs (with L = 96 pins each) and an aver-
age amount x SQPu = =0 5 4.  [kg] of Pu per SFA. If the re-
quired DP is 0.9, then the optimal sampling plans that 
achieve the DP of 0.9 are given by
case case1
296
1072
2
808
560
:
:
:
, :
:
:
ICVD
PGET
DCVD
PGET
The number of PGET measurements in case 1 is consider-
ably higher compared to case 2. This is due to the fact that 
in case 1 the PGET has to cover all pin removals rpin with 
1 95≤ ≤rpin , where in case 2 only the region 1 28≤ ≤rpin  
has solely covered by the PGET.
Second, suppose only 20 PGET measurements can be 
performed, but there is no restriction on the number of 
ICVD measurements, i.e. the entire spent fuel pond can be 
verified by the ICVD. Thus, we consider the sampling plan 
(n1,  n2,  n3)  =  (1980,0,20) that yields, using Eq.  (5), an 
achieved DP of about 0 028. , which is usually far too low in 
this context.
In this section only one class of SFAs has been considered 
which is a valid assumption if the variation (variance) of the 
amount of Pu amongst the SFAs in the spent fuel pond is 
not “too big”. An example with two classes of SFAs is pre-
sented in section 6.
5. One class of SFAs: Non-equal diversion 
scenarios
In this section non-equal diversion scenarios, which are 
usually not addressed in common safeguards literature, 
are considered.
The sampling plans in sections 3 and 4 are based on the 
equal diversion hypothesis which leads to the relation be-
tween rpin and r rSAF pin( ) in Eq. (2). The diverter, however, 
does not need to falsify SFAs according to this hypothesis. 
For illustration, let N = 2000, L = 96 and x Pu = 2  [kg] and 
let the diverter removes 4 pins from 21 SFAs and 30 pins 
from 10 SFAs. Then he acquires exactly
2
96
4 21 30 10 8
[ ]
[ ] ,
kg
kg× × + ×( ) =
of Pu. Using Table 4, we see that the 21 SFAs falsified by 
4 pins each can only be successfully identified as falsified 
by the PGET, while the 10 SFAs falsified by 30 pins each 
can be identified as falsified by both the PGET and the 
DCVD.
Let us assume that the required DP is 0.5. Following the 
same procedure as described in section 4 for BWR-90 % 
example, we f ind the sampling plan (n1,  n2,  n3)  = 
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(59,162,97) to be optimal if the equal diversion hypothesis 
is true. What is the achieved DP if the diverter removes the 
pins as indicated above and if the inspector sticks to the 
optimal sampling plan (59,162,97)?
We first determine the achieved DP in case the sampling 
is performed in the order n3 → n2 → n1, which means that 
we first sample the SFAs verified by the PGET, then we 
sample (from the remaining N – n3 SFAs) the SFAs veri-
fied by the DCVD, and finally we sample (from the re-
maining  N – n3 – n2 SFAs) the SFAs verified by the ICVD. 
The event of non-detection occurs if for the PGET meas-
urements none of the 21 + 10 = 31 SFAs are in the sam-
ple, and for the subsequent DCVD measurements none 
of the 10 SFAs with 30 missing pins are in the sample. 
Thus, the achieved DP is
1
31
0
31 10
0
10
3
3
3
2
−




−











− −



−
N
n
N
n
N n
n
N n
n
3
2
0 91



≈ . .
In case the sampling is done in the order n3 → n2 → n1, the 
event of non-detection occurs if for the DCVD measure-
ments none of the 10 SFAs with 30 missing pins but i SFAs 
out of the 21 SFAs with 4 missing pins (and which can only 
be identified with PGET) are sampled, and for the subse-
quent PGET measurements none of 21 – i remaining SFAs 
with 4 missing pins, are sampled. The achieved DP is, us-
ing the multivariate hypergeometric distribution (see [11]), 
given by
1
21 10
0
31 21
0
0
21
2
2
−








−
−








−

=
∑
i
i
N
n i
N
n
i 

− − −( )



−



≈
N n i
n
N n
n
2
3
2
3
21
0 85. .
Two comments on this example: First, the achieved DP 
depends on the order the sampling is performed: The or-
der n3 → n2 → n1 leads – at least in this example – to 
a higher DP than the order n2 → n3 → n1. Whether this is 
true in general has to be investigated. In section 7 it is 
shown that under the equal diversion hypothesis the order 
of sampling does not have any influence on the DP.
Second, the achieved DP is – for both orders considered 
above and using the optimal sampling plan (59,162,97) – 
higher than 0.5 which was used for finding (59,162,97) 
under the equal diversion hypothesis. Therefore, one can 
ask whether this hypothesis is a worst case in the sense 
that the sampling plan found under the equal diversion 
hypothesis also achieves the required DP for all non-
equal diversion scenarios, i.e. in case the diverter does 
not remove pins according to the equal diversion 
hypothesis.
6. Two classes of SFAs: Example
We now consider two classes of BWR (with L = 96 pins 
each) SFAs with N1 = 217 and N2 = 297 SFAs per class in 
the same spent fuel pond, e.g., one class of SFAs with 
high burn-up and one class of SFAs with very low burn-up. 
The average amounts of Pu are assumed to be x1 1 5= .  
[kg] and x 2 3=  [kg] of Pu per SFA in class i = 1,2. Again, 
the diverter wants to remove pins from SFAs to acquire 
8 [kg] of Pu. In contrast to sections 3 and 4 he can now 
get the material from both classes: If mi, i = 1,2, denotes 
the nuclear material mass diverted from class  i, then we 
have m m1 2 8+ ≥ . To keep the example manageable, we 
only take special values of  ( , )m m1 2  into account:
M : , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,= ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }8 0 7 1 6 2 5 3 4 4 3 5 2 6 17 0 8 .  (9)
Because 8 ≤ x Ni i  for i  =  1,2, we have 8 0 0 8, , ,( ) ( )∈M . 
Within each class the diverter is – as before – assumed to 
remove rpin, i from r m rSFA i pin i, ,( ) SFAs of class  i, i  =  1,2, 
where, using Eq. (2),
 r m r
m
x rSFA i i pin i
i
i pin i
, ,
,
, .( ) = ×





96 1  (10)
Let n1,j resp. n2,j, j = 1,2,3, denote the sample size in class 1 
and 2, where n1,1 resp. n2,1 SFAs are verified by the ICVD, 
n1,2 resp. n2,2 by the DCVD, and n1,3 resp. n2,3 by the PGET, 
i.e. the first index indicates the class and the second one 
the measurement method. The identification probabilities 
are given in Table 4.
Using Eq. (3), the sets X m1 1( ) and X m2 2( ) of diversion strat-
egies in the first resp. second class is for i = 1,2 given by
X m
m L
x N
Li i
i
i i
( ) = ×





…






, , .
The overall (over both classes together) DP is, for any 
m m M1 2,( )∈  and for any r r X m X mpin pin, ,,1 2 1 1 2 2( )∈ ( )× ( ), giv-
en by
= 
DP N1, N2, n1,1, n1,2, n1,3, n2,1, n2,2, n2,3, m1, rpin,1, m2, rpin,2 
1 - 1 - DP (N1, n1,1, n1,2, n1,3, m1, rpin,1) 1 - DP (N2, n2,1, n2,2, 
n2,3, m2, rpin,2),
(11)
where DP N1, n1,1, n1,2, n1,3, m1, rpin,1 and DP N2, n2,1, n2,2, n2,3, 
m2, rpin,2 are defined by Eq.  (5) in which r m rSFA i i pin i, ,,( )  of 
Eq. (10) is used.
As before we are interested in sampling plans  n1,1, n1,2, n1,3  
and  n2,1, n2,2, n2,3  that achieve the required DP 1− βreq  inde-
pendent of the actual diversion strategy. Because the di-
verter may acquire 1 SQ from one of the classes only (see 
the left and right element in the set M in Eq. (9)), the ap-
proach is section 3 implies that  n1,1, n1,2, n1,3  and  n2,1, n2,2, 
n2,3  have to fulfil inequality (7) for each class separately. 
This gives for βreq = 0 1.  the optimal sampling plans
  n1,1, n1,2, n1,3  = (0,45,24) and  n2,1, n2,2, n2,3  = (0,98,61) (12)
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for each class individually. Does the sampling plan given 
by Eq. (12) achieves the overall DP of 0.9 for all diversion 
strategies m m M1 2,( )∈  or only for m m1 2 0 8, ( , )( ) =  and 
m m1 2 8 0, ( , )( ) = ? I.e. we need to check whether the 
achieved overall DP is at least 0.9 for all pairs m m M1 2,( )∈ , 
i.e. whether
min min , , ,
( , ) ,
,
, ,m m M r r X m X mpin pin
DP N N n n
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 11
∈ ( )∈ ( )× ( ) 12 13 21 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,, , , , , , , ,n n n n m r m rpin pin( )  (13)
is at least 0.9. According the multiplicative structure of the 
overall DP in Eq. (11), the minimization of the overall DP 
over the set r r X m X mpin pin, ,,1 2 1 1 2 2( )∈ ( )× ( ) is equivalent to 
minimizing the individual DPs DP N1, n1,1, n1,2, n1,3, m1, rpin,1 
and DP N2, n2,1, n2,2, n2,3, m2, rpin,2 over X m1 1( ) and X m2 2( ), 
respectively.
Consider the pair m m1 2 2 6, ( , )( ) = . Then Eqs. (5) and (12) 
imply (rounded to the fourth digit after the dot)
( )DP N n n n r
r
for rpin
pin
p1 11 12 13 1
1
2
0 4467 28
0 5358, , , ,
.
., , , ,
,
=
=
in
pinr
,
,.
1
1
95
0 5358 96
=
=


and
( )DP N n n n r
r
for rpin
pin
p2 21 2 2 2 3 2
2
6
0 8037 28
0 9009, , , ,
.
., , , ,
,
=
=
in
pinr
,
,. ,
2
2
95
0 7849 96
=
=



and thus, we get for the achieved overall DP by Eq. (11) 
and the comment after Eq. (13)
1 1 0 4467 1 0 7849 0 881 0 9− −( )× −( ) = <. . . . ,
i.e. the sampling plan given by Eq. (12) does not achieve 
the required overall DP of 0.9. If we increase in Eq. (12) the 
ICVD measurements by 1 verification in each class, and 
the DCVD and PGET measurements by 3 verifications in 
each class, i.e. if we consider the sampling plan
n n n n n n11 12 13 21 2 2 2 3148 27 110164, , , , , ,, , , , , , , , ,( ) = ( ) ( ) = ( )and  (14)
then the overall DP of 0.9 is achieved for all diversion strat-
egies m m M1 2,( )∈ .
Two remarks: First, the sampling plan given by Eq. (14) is 
most likely not optimal, i.e. a sampling plan with shorter net 
measurement times might be found using more sophisticat-
ed methods other than just shifting sample sizes by a con-
stant. Second, the sampling plan given by Eq. (14) achieves 
the overall DP of 0.9 for all diversion strategies m m M1 2,( )∈  
but not necessarily for all diversion strategies of a more re-
fined set which includes M as a subset, such as
8 0 7 5 0 5 7 1 17 0 5 7 5 0 8, , . , . , , , , , , . , . ,( , )( ) ( ) ( ) … ( ) ( ){ }
in which, in contrast to Eq.  (9), an incremental step of 
0.5  [kg] is used. Indeed, the sampling plan given by 
Eq. (14) yields an achieved overall DP of about 0.898 for 
m m1 2 4 5 3 5, ( . , . )( ) = .
7. Derivations
To derive Eq. (5), we need to model the way the random 
sampling is performed: Quite generally, the following or-
ders are possible: n3  →  n2  →  n1, n3  →  n1  →  n2, 
n2  →  n1  →  n3, n2  →  n3  →  n1, n1  →  n2  →  n3 and 
n1 → n3 → n2 (n3 → n2 → n1 means: first sample the SFAs 
that are verified by the PGET, then sample the SFAs veri-
fied by the DCVD, and finally sample the SFAs verified by 
the ICVD) and the possibility to choose n1 + n2 + n3 SFAs 
from the population of SFAs and then distributed them to 
the verification methods i, i = 1,2,3. We claim that Eq. (5) is 
true independent of the chosen order, and prove this 
statement for the cases: 1) n3  →  n2  →  n1 and 
2) n2 → n3 → n1. Although the proof in case 1) is rather ob-
vious, we present it here in order to show the differences 
between cases 1) and 2).
Ad 1): If 1 0 3 1≤ ≤   −r Lpin . , then non-detection occurs if 
and only if none of the r rSFA pin( ) falsified SFAs are sampled 
for PGET verifications. The DCVD and ICVD measure-
ments do not influence the DP in this case. Thus, we get 
with r r rSFA SFA pin: ( )=
 1
0
13
3
3
3
−




−







= −
−





r N r
n
N
n
N r
n
N
n
SFA SFA SFA
 
 (15)
which is the first equation in Eq. (5). If 0 3 1. L r Lpin  ≤ ≤ − , 
then non-detection occurs if and only if none of the 
r rSFA pin( ) falsified SFAs are sampled for PGET or DCVD ver-
ifications. The ICVD measurements do not influence the 
DP in this case. Thus, we have
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where the equal sign can be shown by expanding the bi-
nomial coefficients. If rpin = L, then we get in analogy to 
Eq. (16) 
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i.e. the third equation in Eq. (5).
Ad 2): If 1 0 3 1≤ ≤   −r Lpin . , then non-detection occurs 1) if 
any SFA is sampled for DVCD verifications (i.e. even falsi-
fied SFAs can be sampled, because they can only be 
identified as falsified by the PGET), and 2) if none of the 
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remaining falsified SFAs are sampled for PGET verifica-
tions. Again, the ICVD measurements do not have an im-
pact on the DP in this case. Thus, we obtain for the DP 
with r r rSFA SFA pin: ( )=
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Note that the lower bound of the sum in Eq. (18) is due to 
the fact that N r n iSFA− ≥ −2  and N n r i nSFA− − −( ) ≥2 3 , 
w h i c h  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  i n N rSFA≥ − −2 ( )  a n d 
i n n N rSFA≥ + − −2 3 ( ).
Eqs. (15) and (18) demonstrate the influence of the order 
the sampling is done on the DP formula. As announced, 
however, we show that both DP formulae are equivalent.
Expanding the binomial coefficients, the sum expression in 
Eq. (18) simplifies to
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for any positive integers a, b and m, see [11], we finally get 
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i.e. the first line of Eq. (5) and Eq. (15). If 0 3 1. L r Lpin  ≤ ≤ − , 
then the non-detection event occurs if and only if none of 
the rSFA( rpin) falsified SFAs are sampled for the PGET and 
DCVD verifications. Thus, its probability is given by Eq. (16) 
changing n3 → n2 and n2 → n3. The case rpin = L is given by 
Eq. (17) again with the replacements n3 → n2 and n2 → n3.
8. Future work and outlook
The following four topics could be examined in future re-
search activities: First, a sensitivity analysis could be car-
ried out that studies the consequences of the instruments 
identification thresholds on optimal sampling plans. For ex-
ample: The ICVD identification threshold could be lower 
down from 100% to 50%, i.e. the identification probability 
is one if and only if “50% of the pins or more have been re-
moved”; see Eq. (1). For the DCVD, a reduction of the 30% 
threshold down to 10% could be considered.
Second, as expanded at the end of section 5, it should be 
investigated whether optimal sampling plans obtained un-
der the equal diversion hypothesis assure the required DP 
for all non-equal diversion scenarios. Also the influence of 
the order the sampling is performed on the DP needs to be 
investigated.
Third, in case of a non-homogeneous population of SFAs in 
a spent fuel pond the question of the appropriate number of 
classes of SFAs, which are characterized by different aver-
age amounts of Pu, has to be addressed. This number will 
depend on the SFAs masses and their variation (variance). 
A related topic has already been investigated in [14].
Fourth, the example in section 6 calls for an efficient algo-
rithm for the determination of optimal sampling plans in 
case more than one class of SFAs are stored in the spent 
fuel pond.
In a future scenario the use of robots could support the in-
spectorates to confirm the presence of spent fuel in 
a pond. In this light a nuclear focused robotics challenge 
co-hosted by the IAEA took place in November 2017 in 
Australia. The aim of this challenge was to attach an ICVD 
inside a small robotized floating platform, which autono-
mously carries out the verification measurements by mov-
ing across the surface of the pond; see [15]. The conse-
quences of using robots on the sample sizes can be 
studied as soon as it becomes clear which inspection ac-
tivities can be carried through or supported by robots and 
what the robots’ identification capabilities are.
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Abstract:
The dif ferential die-away self-interrogation (DDSI) 
instrument developed and built in Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) is being considered for verification 
before final disposal. One of the signals from this 
instrument, the early die-away time, has been shown to be 
proportional to the multiplication of the spent fuel 
assembly. Full-scale simulations of the instrument 
response using MCNP are time consuming. This may 
become a problem in cases when the instrument response 
to a large number of fuel assemblies is required, such as in 
the case of training machine learning models.
In this paper, we propose a parametrization of the early die-
away time as a function of initial enrichment (IE), burn-up 
(BU) and cooling time (CT), for intact PWR spent fuel 
assemblies. The parametrization is calculated from 
a dataset of 1040 simulated PWR spent fuel assemblies 
with fuel parameters in the range of IE=2-5%, BU=15-
60 GWd/tU and CT=5-70 years. The simulations are done 
using Serpent2 for the depletion calculation and MCNP6 
for the neutron transport and detection in the DDSI.
It was found that the CT dependence can be decoupled 
from the BU and IE dependence, and that it follows an 
exponential decay. The BU and IE dependences have 
been fitted with several different functions, and the best fit 
was chosen based on the chi-square value. The 
dete rminat ion of  the d ie-away t ime us ing the 
parametrization has been tested on a separate dataset, 
resulting in a root mean square error (RMSE) of 0.6 µs (the 
early die-away time ranges from 28 µs to 84  µs). 
A description of this work is given in the paper together 
with details on the choice of parametrizing function, and 
qualitative arguments for that choice.
Keywords: DDSI; die-away time; parametrization; model-
ling; PWR
1. Introduction
The differential die-away self-interrogation (DDSI) tech-
nique has been studied by Los Alamos National Laborato-
ry (LANL) [1] as part of the Next Generation Safeguards In-
itiative - Spent Fuel [2]. A prototype instrument has been 
manufactured and recently tested on spent nuclear fuel at 
Clab [3]; the technique may also be considered for future 
use at encapsulation facilities.
As has been shown in [4] for simulation space, and in [3] 
and [5] for experimental data, the DDSI early die-away 
time, τ, is proportional to the multiplication of a fuel assem-
bly. The early die-away time is defined as the decay con-
stant in an exponential fit to the real coincidence Rossi-al-
pha distribution for neutrons, in the time domain of 4 to 52 
μs. The proportionality to the multiplication makes τ an in-
teresting instrument response to study, especially in the 
context of nuclear safeguards verification where the fuel 
assembly parameters initial enrichment (IE), burnup (BU) 
and cooling time (IE) as well as fissile mass are central 
concepts. The reason is that assembly multiplication re-
flects the balance between the fissile content and neutron 
absorbers such as fission products and minor actinides in 
the assembly. This balance, in turn, varies with the fuel pa-
rameters IE, BU, and CT.
Full-scale simulations of the DDSI instrument response us-
ing Monte Carlo techniques are however time consuming, 
especially if many such simulations are needed. For this 
reason, we here present a parametrization of the early die-
away time, as a function of fuel parameters CT, IE and BU, 
which can be used as an approximation of the instrument 
response in place of the full simulations.
Section 2 of this paper describes the simulation methods 
used to obtain the instrument response, section 3 explains 
how the parametrization was derived and section 4 shows 
the results of the parametrization for a separate data set.
2. Simulation methods
The simulations of the response of the DDSI instrument to 
spent nuclear fuel are done in two steps. In the first step, 
a depletion calculation is performed with Serpent2 [6] to 
get the isotopic content of the spent fuel. In the second 
step, the neutron transport and detection is simulated in 
MCNP6 [7].
Simulations have been performed for 1040 PWR spent 
fuel assemblies, covering a range of values of IE, BU and 
CT. IE ranges from 2-5 % atomic weight in steps of 
0.25 % (corresponding to a range of 1.98 to 4.94 % in 
mass weight), and BU ranges between 15-60 GWd/tU in 
Parametrization of the differential die-away self-
interrogation early die-away time for PWR spent 
fuel assemblies
Li Caldeira Balkeståhl, Zsolt Elter, Sophie Grape
Uppsala University, Division of Applied Nuclear Physics, Uppsala, Sweden
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steps of 5 GWd/tU up to 40 GWd/tU and then in two 
more steps of 10 GWd/tU. CT ranges between 5-70 y, 
with smaller steps for shorter cooling times (5 y, 7.5 y, 10 
y, 12.5 y, 15 y, 20 y, 30 y, 40 y, 55 y and 70 y). The choice 
of a grid with an uneven sampling of BU and CT space is 
made to more accurately capture the variation of τ with 
these variables, with a  smaller grid spacing where 
τ changes more rapidly.
2.1 Burnup calculation
The burnup, or depletion, calculation is performed in Ser-
pent2 in criticality source mode, in an infinite 2D lattice. 
The geometry consists of one pin surrounded by water, 
with reflective boundary conditions. The pin radius is 0.41 
cm, the inner cladding radius 0.42 cm, the outer cladding 
radius 0.48 cm and the pitch 1.26 cm.
The fuel cycles are defined as cycles of 365 days of irradi-
ation at constant power density, resulting in a burnup of 10 
GWd/tU per cycle, followed by a down-time of 30 days. 
The length of the last cycle is adjusted to give the desired 
burnup, and the desired cooling time is then calculated 
with the radioactive decay of the spent fuel.
The simulated spent fuel assemblies resulting from this 
depletion calculation are ideal in several respects: the 
assembly is uniform, all pins have identical properties; 
and all assemblies follow idealized cycles (while com-
mercial assemblies might e.g. spend a cycle outside the 
reactor).
2.2 DDSI physics and modelling
The DDSI instrument consists of 56 3He tubes in four de-
tector pods surrounding the fuel assembly, as described 
in [1]. The instrument detects neutrons emitted from the 
spent nuclear fuel, and can be used to calculate the early 
die-away time τ.
The detected neutrons follow the Rossi-alpha distribution 
(shown in figure 1). This distribution describes the time dif-
ference between detected neutrons, and the non-flat dis-
tribution can be explained by the correlation between de-
tected neutrons from the same fission or fission chain. 
There are in fact two components that describe the neu-
tron correlation, a fast and a slow component, and both 
are exponential in nature. The fast component corre-
sponds to neutrons from the same fission event or from 
a fast fission chain, but since the instrument is not capable 
of resolving this time scale, the decay time of this compo-
nent instead depends on the instrument geometry and the 
thermalization of the neutrons before detection. The slow 
component corresponds to neutrons from a thermal fis-
sion chain, i.e. where the neutron thermalizes before in-
ducing a new fission.
The early die-way time results from an interplay between 
the two components, and has been shown [3-5] to be pro-
portional to the multiplication of the fuel assembly. τ meas-
ures how long the neutron population survives in the spent 
fuel and a larger τ -value shows that the neutrons die-away 
more slowly. Fissile material therefore increases τ, while 
neutron poisons decrease it, and the value for each spent 
fuel assembly is a result of the interplay between these 
two types of materials.
In MCNP6, the DDSI instrument is modelled surrounding 
PWR 17x17 spent fuel assemblies, all submerged in water. 
The fuel pins in the assembly have the geometry described 
earlier, and the material composition is taken from the out-
put of the Serpent2 simulation. The source term is defined 
as a spontaneous fission source, and it is distributed even-
ly in all the fuel rods. The source is restricted to 145 cm of 
axial length, centred on the DDSI instrument, as a means 
to speed up the simulation while retaining most of the sig-
nal (for details see [8]). The F8 coincidence capture tallies 
are used to calculate the Rossi-alpha distribution of real 
coincidences, similarly as in [1]. The Rossi-alpha distribu-
tion is simulated from 0 to 200 μs, and τ is calculated from 
an exponential fit over the range 4-52 μs (including statisti-
cal errors).
Figure 1: Rossi-alpha distribution for real coincident neutrons as 
simulated with MCNP6. The simulated spent fuel assembly has 
IE=3.5 %, BU=43 GWd/tU and CT=59 y, and τ= 37.0 ± 0.4 μs.
3. Parametrization of τ
Intuitively, since the early die-away time is proportional to 
multiplication, we expect it to decrease with BU (less fissile 
material and more neutron absorbers are present) and to 
increase with IE (more fissile material is present). The CT 
dependence is not so intuitive, most of the fissile material 
will not depend on CT, although 241Pu does. Figures 2-4 
show how τ depends on IE, BU and CT for a part of the 
data. The dependence for the whole dataset is smooth, 
and an interpolation between the shown data points can 
be made.
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Figure 2: The τ dependence on IE, for low BU (a), high BU (b), low CT (c) and high CT (d). In the top figures, the colors indicate different 
CT, for the bottom figures it indicates different BU. For a more understandable figure, all simulated data points are not shown.
a)
c) 
b)
d)
As can be seen from figures 2a-2d, there is a strong de-
pendence of τ on IE. As expected, τ  increases with in-
creasing IE. Figures 2a-2b show that the IE dependence 
does not depend on CT, since the data sets correspond-
ing to different CT are only separated by a constant offset 
depending on CT. Figures 2c-2d however show a noticea-
ble effect of BU on the IE dependence, with an increasing 
slope for lower BU-values.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from figure 3. Figures 
3a-3b show a similar shape of the τ-dependence
on BU independent of CT (only the constant offset is dif-
ferent), while figures 3c-3d show a dependence on IE 
where different IE-values give different slopes to the 
τ-dependence on BU.
Figure 4 shows that the CT-dependence can be described 
with an exponentially decreasing function, with figures 4a-
4b showing that IE only affects a constant offset and not 
the exponential itself, and figures 4c-4d show the same 
but for BU. The different scales of the y-axis make it diffi-
cult to compare different subplots with each other, but one 
can note this effect also by comparing the different colors 
in each subfigure (they colored data sets only vary by 
a constant offset). This implies that the CT dependence, 
described by an exponential function, is independent of IE 
and BU except for a constant offset. Since the IE and BU 
dependencies are interconnected, it is more difficult to as-
sess what functional form to use in order to describe them. 
However, the figures qualitatively tell us that τ increases 
with IE, with a steeper slope for low BU (e.g. figure 2c); and 
τ decreases with BU, with a slope that increases with 
higher IE and flattens out with BU (eg figure 3c).
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Figure 3: The τ dependence on BU, for low IE (a), high IE (b), low CT (c) and high CT (d). For the top figures, the colors indicate different 
CT, for the bottom figure it indicates different IE. For a more understandable figure, all simulated data points are not shown.
Figure 4: The τ dependence on CT, for low BU (a), high BU (b), low IE (c) and high IE (d). For the top figures, the colors indicate different 
IE, for the bottom figure the colors indicates different BU.
a)
c)
b)
d)
a)
c)
b)
d)
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3.1 Physical considerations
As mentioned above, the early die-away time depends on 
the quantity of fissile material and neutron absorbers (such 
as some fission products) in the fuel. To understand which 
isotopes that are most important when determining τ, we 
have investigated three quantities in eight example fuels: i) 
the neutron absorption rate, ii) the neutron induced fission 
rate and iii) the rate of neutrons produced from fission. The 
eight example fuels have low and high CT, low and high 
BU and low and high IE. The respective rates were calcu-
lated using the MCNP6 F4 neutron flux tally score, multi-
plied with the relevant cross-sections. The isotopes where 
then ranked according to the absolute value of their net 
neutron emission rate, defined as the difference between 
the neutron emission rate from fission and the total neu-
tron absorption, where total neutron absorption also in-
cludes neutrons lost to fission.
Looking at the top six isotopes for each of the eight exam-
ple fuels, we find that the sixth isotope always has a net 
neutron emission which is at least one order of magnitude 
smaller than the first isotope. Table 1 shows the six top 
ranked isotopes for one of the eight fuels.
Isotope Net neutron emission [au]
239Pu 7.8
235U 4.4
238U -4.2
241Pu 2.4
240Pu -2.0
143Nd -0.51
Table 1: Net neutron emissions for an example fuel with IE=4.9%, 
BU=60 GWd/tU and CT=5y.
To reach a reduction in net neutron emission of two orders 
of magnitude, it was sometimes necessary to consider 30 
ranked isotopes. In qualitatively understanding the impact 
of the different isotopes on τ, we focus here on eight iso-
topes that appear at least once in the top five list for the 
eight fuels: 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu, 241Am, 235U, 238U, 155Gd and 
149Sm. The top 3 list is often consisting of 239Pu, 235U and 
238U. The following subsections give some insight into the 
mechanism governing τ and its dependence on IE, BU 
and CT. A more quantitative understanding is beyond the 
scope of this paper.
3.1.1 CT dependence of τ
From the list of isotopes above, the one isotope with a half-
life likely to have a visible effect in the range of CT=5-70 
y is 241Pu (t½ = 14.3 y). This isotope mainly β
--decays to 
241Am. While 241Pu is fissile and has a positive contribution 
to the early die-away time (more 241Pu gives a  larger τ), 
241Am absorbs neutrons and has a low probability of fis-
sioning, and thus has a negative contribution to τ. From 
these considerations, one would expect τ to follow an ex-
ponential decay law with CT, with a mean lifetime (the in-
verse of the exponential decay constant λ) smaller than 
that of 241Pu, since the decay of 241Pu creates 241Am which 
lowers τ even more. This is indeed the result found in the 
study; the mean lifetime of 241Pu is 20.6 y, and the mean 
lifetime obtained for τ in the fit in section 3.2.1 is 15.8 y (pa-
rameter b in table 3).
3.1.2 BU and IE dependence of τ
Since higher BU means that more fissile 235U nuclei have 
been split, τ is expected to decrease with BU. The buildup 
of other fissile isotopes should offset this and slow down 
the decrease, while production of neutron poisons would 
speed up the decrease. Studying how the 235U concentra-
tion changes as a function of burnup, we note that the rate 
of decrease of the 235U concentration depends on the IE, 
with higher IE resulting in a sharper decrease of the 235U 
concentration with increasing BU.
Figure 5 shows how the total fissile concentration (i.e. 235U, 
239Pu and 241Pu) changes with BU and IE. This dependence 
is very similar to the dependences observed for only 235U, 
and this isotope is hence assumed to dominate the de-
pendence. The dependences in figure 5 are qualitatively 
Figure 5: The concentration of fissile isotopes vs BU (left) and IE (right), colored with the IE (left) and BU (right).
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very similar to the τ-dependence on these variables, so the 
contribution from 235U seems to be the most important one. 
Higher IE, meaning more 235U and less 238U, is expected to 
give larger values of τ, as is also seen in figure 2. As BU in-
creases, the fuel composition becomes more complex and 
varied and the increase of τ with IE slows down.
3.2 Fitting functions
Since the τ-dependence on CT seems to be independent 
of BU and IE, this was investigated first. The function de-
scribing the dependence of τ on CT was chosen to be an 
exponential function of the form
 τ = ⋅ +
−
a e c
CT
b  (1)
where a, b and c are the fitting parameters. The choice of 
the exponential function is explained in section 3.1.1. One 
exponential function (each generating unique a, b and 
c parameter values) was fitted to each group of data points 
with one combination of IE and BU, e.g. each group with 
the same color in one subplot of figure 4. The fit parame-
ters a, b and c are then analyzed with respect to their de-
pendence on IE and BU. The dependences of the a and 
c parameters on BU and IE can be seen in figure 6; the 
dependence of the b parameter looks similar to the a de-
pendence and is hence not shown.
Despite rather large statistical fluctuations in figure 6 (the 
error bars represent the statistical uncertainties in the fit), 
both the a and b parameters have been found to be con-
sistent with a constant value. This means that these two 
parameters can be considered to be independent of IE 
and BU. The c parameter however displays the same trend 
as τ does for a fixed CT, also indicating that the BU and IE 
dependence of τ is captured by the c-parameter and not 
by the a or b parameters. With the ultimate goal of finding 
a function that describes how τ varies with IE, BU and CT, 
equation 1 was accordingly chosen with the a and b pa-
rameters constant for the whole range of IE and BU val-
ues, but with the c parameter replaced by a function that 
better captures the IE and BU dependences.
In the determination of the second function (capturing the 
dependence of the c parameter on BU and IE), a  fit of 
equation 1 was performed to fix the a and b constants 
while allowing the c parameter to vary with BU and IE. Ac-
cordingly, a different c parameter value was obtained for 
each value of IE and BU.
Determining then the BU dependence first, and to avoid 
an unphysical increase of τ with BU values outside the fit-
ting range, an exponential fit (Equation 2) was tried
 c a e c
BU
b
= +⋅
−
1 1
1  (2)
where a1, b1 and c1 are the fit parameters that vary with IE. 
Since each fit, corresponding to one IE value, is associat-
ed with a unique determination of the parameters a1, b1 
and c1, a function can be used to describe how each pa-
rameter varies with IE. This function can be described by 
either a linear, quadratic or constant polynomial of IE. Fig-
ure 7 shows the variation of the parameter values with IE, 
together with a linear fit.
Figure 6: The a (upper row) and c (lower row) parameters resulting from an exponential fit of τ to CT, shown as a function of BU (left) and 
IE (right). The data points corresponding to BU=15 GWd/tU and IE=4,94% are plotted without error bars, since the error associated these 
points is so large that they obscure all other trends. For a more understandable figure, all simulated data points are not shown.
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Figure 7: The dependence of the parameters a1, b1 and c1 of the BU fit (equation 2) on IE. The fitted function is linear in all three cases, 
although table 2 shows that this does not always give the best fit.
Table 2 shows the resulting χ 2 and χ 2 probability values for 
different functions describing the variation of the a1, b1 and 
c1 parameters with IE. Table 2 tells us that the a1 parameter 
is best described by a function that depends quadratically 
on IE, the b1-parameter is best described by a linear func-
tion of IE (although the quadratic function is almost equally 
good), and that the c1 parameter is best described by 
a quadratic function (but a linear function is still relevant to 
try in a global fit).
Parameter Fit type 2 2 probability
a1 Linear 25.7 0.007
Quadratic 5.2 0.88
b1 Linear 10.7 0.45
Quadratic 8.6 0.57
c1 Linear 12.6 0.32
Quadratic 8.0 0.62
Constant 21.3 0.04
Table 2: Fit statistics for the BU parameters a1, b1 and c1 as 
functions of IE.
3.2.1 Global fit
Following the considerations above, several functions were 
tried in order to find a suitable function for a global fit, that 
simultaneously describes the dependence of τ on CT, BU 
and IE. All the functions which were tried, make use of 
equation 1 but with parameter c replaced by a function C, 
as shown in equation 3:
 τ = ⋅ +
−
a e C
CT
b  (3)
Many different functions C were tried and assessed, the 
best function as determined by the resulting χ 2 value is 
shown in equations 4-7
 C c e e
BU
d
= ′ ⋅ +
−
 (4)
 ′ = ⋅ + ⋅ +( )c c IE c IE c2 2 1 0  (5)
 d d IE d IE d= ⋅ + ⋅ +( )2 2 1 0  (6)
 e e IE e IE e= ⋅ + ⋅ +( )2 2 1 0  (7)
The resulting parameter values are shown in table 3. This 
fit has χ 2 = 1245 and χ 2 probability 3.9·10-6. The errors are 
probably underestimated, leading to this large value of χ 2, 
and a better error estimate is under consideration.
Figure 8 shows the τ value determined using the para-
metrization versus the τ value determined using the MCNP 
simulations, together with the line representing a perfect 
fit. As can be understood, the global parametrization func-
tion seems to work quite well.
Parameter Value
a 6.87(8)
b 15.8(4)
c0
c1
c2
-28(3)
33(2)
-1.8(2)
d0
d1
d2
11(1)
3.3(7)
-0.14(10)
e0
e1
e2
28.2(6)
-0.7(4)
0.14(7)
Table 3: Fit parameters determined for the best global fit.
Figure 8: The τ  values determined from the parametrization 
versus those obtained from a  full-scale MCNP6 modelling 
together with a line indicating a perfect match.
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4. Test of parametrization
The parametrization has been tested on a separate set of 
modelled data. The data set comprises 980 simulated 
PWR fuels, with depletion calculations done using Ser-
pent2 as described in section 2. However, the ranges of 
IE, BU and CT were slightly different from the fuels de-
scribed earlier. IE ranged from 2-5% atomic weight in 
steps of 0.5%, while BU and CT were randomly selected 
with a uniform probability in the intervals 15-50 GWd/tU 
and 5-70 y, respectively. Figure 9 shows the early die-away 
time τ determined using the parametrization versus deter-
mination using MCNP, as well as the normalized residuals 
rn
fit sim
sim
=
−τ τ
στ
, centered around zero.
The root mean squared error (RMSE) is 0.57 μs, χ 2 = 1131 
and the χ 2 probability 5.4·10-4. As previously mentioned, 
the errors are probably underestimated, leading to a larger 
value of χ 2 than is to be expected, but this remains to be 
investigated.
5. Conclusion and Outlook
This paper describes a way to estimate the early die-away 
time τ from the DDSI prototype instrument, as a way to 
avoid the computationally demanding MCNP simulations 
that are usually performed. This can be specifically useful 
when die-away times for large number of fuel assemblies 
are required, such as in the case of training machine learn-
ing models.
Our work shows that in the case of modelled PWR 17x17 
fuel assemblies, the CT dependence of the early die-away 
time can be decoupled from the BU and IE dependencies. 
The research also suggested that the CT dependence of 
τ follows an exponential decay. In this work it was decided 
to, in the second step, describe the BU dependence and 
thirdly the IE dependence. The reverse order was tried, al-
though the results are not shown in this paper, and the re-
sults were similar to those obtained here but not as good. 
The BU dependence could be best described using an-
other exponential decay, although other functions with 
a similar fall-off were found to also work well. The IE-de-
pendence was finally captured using functions with 
a quadratic dependence on this parameter.
The die-away times estimated using the resulting para-
metrization function were compared to the accurate esti-
mations using MCNP6 modelling and a fit to the Rossi-al-
pha distribution, and the agreement was shown to be very 
good, also for the case of a new data set of modelled fuel 
assemblies with a slightly different set of fuel parameters 
(within the same range as the first one). As an important 
next step, an experimental validation of this parametriza-
tion is planned, since the ability of the parametrizing func-
tion to estimate the DDSI die-away time for commercial re-
actor fuel might be significantly influenced by a deviation of 
burnup, initial enrichment and cooling time from the as-
sumed ideal case. Furthermore, it is important to study to 
what extent the parametrization function also correctly es-
timates the die-away time for other fuel types or designs.
6. Acknowledgements
We would like to acknowledge the financial support from 
the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority under contracts 
SSM2016-661, SSM2015-4125 and SSM2016-4600.
The authors would also like to thank Dr. Alexis Trahan at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory for her kind assistance 
with respect to DDSI modelling.
Figure 9: The simulated and calculated values of τ for the test data fall close to the line indicating a perfect match (left). The normalized 
residuals are shown in the right figure.
21
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 58, June 2019
7. References
[1] A. Trahan. “Utilization of the Differential Die-Away 
Self-Interrogation Technique for Characterization and 
Verification of Spent Nuclear Fuel”. PhD thesis. Uni-
versity of Michigan, 2016.
[2] M. A. Humphrey, S. T. Tobin, and K. D. Veal. “The 
Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel 
Nondestructive Assay Project”. In: Journal of Nuclear 
Material Management 40 (2012), pp. 6-11.
[3] A. Trahan, G. McMath, P. Mendoza, H. Trellue, U. 
Backstrom, and A. Sjöland. “Preliminary Results from 
the Spent Nuclear Fuel Assembly Field Trials with the 
Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation Instrument”. 
In: Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management 59th Annual Meeting, July 22-26, Balti-
more, Maryland. Institute of Nuclear Materials Man-
agement. 2018.
[4] A. C. Kaplan, V. Henzl, H. O. Menlove, M. T. Swinhoe, 
A. P. Belian, M. Flaska, and S. A. Pozzi. “Determina-
tion of spent nuclear fuel assembly multiplication with 
the d i f fe rent ia l  d ie-away se l f- inte r rogat ion 
instrument”. In: Nuclear Instruments and Methods in 
Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spec-
trometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment 757 
(2014), pp. 20-27.
[5] A. C. Trahan, A. P. Belian, M. T. Swinhoe, H. O. Men-
love, M. Flaska, and S. A. Pozzi. “Fresh Fuel Meas-
urements with the Differential Die-Away Self-Interro-
gation Instrument”. In: IEEE Transactions on Nuclear 
Science 64.7 (2017), pp. 1664-1669.
[6] J. Leppänen, M. Pusa, T. Viitanen, V. Valtavirta, and 
T. Kaltiaisenaho. “The Serpent Monte Carlo code: 
Status, development and applications in 2013”. In: 
Annals of Nuclear Energy 82 (2015), pp. 142-150.
[7] T. Goorley et al. “Initial MCNP6 Release Overview”. In: 
Nuclear Technology 180.3 (2012), pp. 298-315.
[8] L. Caldeira Balkeståhl, Z. Elter, S. Grape, and C. Hel-
lesen. “MCNP simulations of prototype DDSI detec-
tor”. In: Proceedings of the International Workshop on 
Numerical Modelling of NDA Instrumentation and 
Methods for Nuclear Safeguards (NM-NDA-IMNS18). 
ESARDA. 2018.
22
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 58, June 2019
Abstract:
The nuclear material contained in the spent fuel 
assemblies represents the majority of the material verified 
during the safeguards inspections, and the replacement of 
spent fuel pins from an assembly is one of the possible 
scenarios to divert nuclear material.
Due to the high number of fuel pins contained in a fuel 
assembly (e.g. 264 pins in a  PWR 17x17 geometry), 
a practically infinite number of diversion scenarios can be 
considered by a potential proliferator. In this framework, 
Monte Carlo simulations were used to model some of the 
possible diversion scenarios and to develop a database of 
detector responses corresponding to dif ferent non-
destructive assay (NDA) techniques. In addition, the 
database contains the detector responses obtained with 
complete fuel assemblies with different initial enrichment, 
burnup, and cooling time.
Given the large size of the database and the multiple detector 
responses resulting from the NDA techniques, the use of 
machine learning is proposed for the data analysis. In this 
work we focus on the classification problem with the aim of 
classifying the diversion scenarios based on the percentage 
of replaced pins. Several machine learning models were 
developed for this problem using decision trees, discriminant 
analysis, support vector machine, and nearest neighbors 
algorithms. The accuracy of the models was calculated as 
the number of correct classifications in the whole dataset.
The results from the study show that the selection of the 
detector type used as input in the machine learning model 
has a strong impact on the accuracy of the developed 
model. In general the use of gamma-ray detectors leads to 
higher accuracies compared to the use of neutron 
detector responses. In addition, several machine learning 
models achieved a complete correct classification.
Keywords: Machine learning, fuel diversion, Monte Carlo, 
spent fuel, non-destructive assays
1. Introduction
As defined in the INFCIRC/153 [1] the technical objective of 
safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant 
quantities of nuclear material. The nuclear material 
contained in the spent fuel assemblies represents the ma-
jority of the material verified during the safeguards inspec-
tions [2], and the replacement of spent fuel pins from an 
assembly is one of the possible scenarios to divert nuclear 
material.
The capabilities to detect a subset of missing or replaced 
spent fuel pins, the so-called partial defect testing, were 
assessed in the past for the Fork detector [3]. In addition, 
several non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques are pro-
posed to improve the current capabilities for partial defect 
testing [4], [5]. Among others NDA techniques, the Self-In-
dication Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) and 
the Partial Defect Tester (PDET) have been investigated in 
the past years at SCK•CEN [6].
Given the large number of diversion scenarios that can be 
developed and the multiple detector responses resulting 
from the two NDA techniques, the use of machine learn-
ing [7] is proposed for the data analysis as alternative to 
a previous approach chosen in recent work [8]. Due also 
to the continuous increase in the computer power, ma-
chine learning is extensively used in many fields where 
large amount of data is available [9], [10]. Within SCK•CEN, 
research on machine learning applied to the safeguards 
field focused so far on the use of artificial neural networks 
(ANN) for the determination of initial enrichment, burnup, 
and cooling time of spent fuel assemblies [11].
In this contribution the NDA technique chosen for the 
study is described in Section 2, whereas the overview of 
the Monte Carlo simulations is presented in Section 3, and 
the description of the machine learning models is included 
in Section 4. The results from the data analysis are dis-
cussed in Section 5, followed by the conclusion and out-
look for future work in Section 6.
2. Description of the NDA technique
2.1 Models geometry
The NDA technique chosen for this study stems from the 
Self-Indication Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) 
and the Partial Defect Tester (PDET).
The SINRD technique is a passive NDA technique that was 
originally developed by LANL based on the passive 
Use of machine learning models for the detection of fuel 
pin replacement in spent fuel assemblies
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neutron emission from spent fuel due to spontaneous fis-
sions and (α,n) reactions [12]. The principle of the SINRD 
technique is to measure the attenuation of the neutron flux 
in the 0.3 eV energy region to obtain a direct estimation of 
the 239Pu content in the spent fuel. The technique has 
been studied for the measurement of spent fuel underwa-
ter at LANL [13], [14], [15], whereas a measurement ap-
proach in air has been investigated at SCK•CEN [16], [6].
Previous research [6] indicated that the use of 239Pu fission 
chambers increased the sensitivity to the 239Pu content in 
the spent fuel. In addition, the fast neutron flux was meas-
ured with 238U fission chambers according to the approach 
developed at SCK•CEN.
The Partial Defect Tester (PDET) is a NDA technique that 
measures the passive neutron and gamma emission from 
the fuel assembly by inserting a set of small detectors in 
the guide tubes of a PWR fuel assembly [17], [18], [19]. The 
PDET was originally proposed by LLNL with the aim of de-
tecting partial defects, and a PDET prototype has been 
built and tested in a measurement campaign at the Swed-
ish Interim Storage Facility CLAB in January 2015 [20]. The 
total neutron flux was measured with 235U fission cham-
bers, whereas the gamma-ray flux was measured with ion-
ization chambers.
The NDA detector setup adopted in this study is shown in 
Figure 1 for both measurements in air and in fresh water. 
A thick slab of polyethylene surrounds the fuel assembly 
during the measurement in air (left side of Figure 1) to en-
sure neutron moderation. The PWR 17x17 fuel assembly 
geometry was considered in all simulations.
The detector types considered for the SINRD technique 
and those used by PDET are combined in the NDA tech-
nique proposed for this study, and the details of the detec-
tor responses are described in Section 2.2. The detectors 
positions include the guide tubes (red and yellow positions 
in Figure 1) as in the approach proposed for the PDET de-
tector, but also additional detectors are placed around the 
fuel assembly (green positions).
2.2 Detector responses
The detector responses were calculated from the results of 
the Monte Carlo simulations and following the approach 
proposed in [6]. As shown in Figure 1, for both measure-
ment in air and in fresh water the detector positions and 
the detector types are identical. The calculated detector 
responses include:
• Thermal neutrons (TH): bare 235U fission chamber;
• Fast neutrons (FAST): bare 238U fission chamber;
• Resonance region neutrons (RES): difference between 
the neutron counts with a 239Pu fission chamber covered 
by Gd foil and a 239Pu fission chamber covered by Cd 
foil;
• Gamma-rays (P): ionization chamber.
Figure 1: Monte Carlo models of the detector setups chosen in this study. The PWR 17x17 fuel assembly is represented with the fuel pins 
shown in black. The positions of the detectors are depicted in red, yellow, and green. The detector responses are normalized to the value 
obtained for the detector position marked with a cross. The picture on the left shows the setup for the measurement in air, with the 
polyethylene slab in grey surrounding the fuel assembly, and the picture on the right shows the setup for the measurement in fresh water 
(depicted in blue).
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3. Overview of the Monte Carlo simulations
3.1 Complete fuel assemblies
The same set of Monte Carlo simulations was performed 
both for the NDA technique in air and in fresh water. From 
each simulation the detector responses were normalized 
to the value obtained for the detector marked with a cross 
in Figure 1. The average value was then calculated for the 
nine central guide tube positions, the sixteen peripheral 
guide tube positions, and the forty detector positions out-
side the fuel assembly. The choice to normalize the detec-
tor responses followed the approach for the PDET detec-
tor where the detector responses are normalized to one 
detector position [18]. In this way the range of values of the 
normalized detector responses is greatly reduced com-
pared to the range of the un-normalized detector 
responses. Future work will consider as input the detector 
responses before the normalization and will estimate the 
influence of this step in the accuracy of the machine learn-
ing models.
A first set of simulations was performed with complete fuel 
assemblies, i.e. assemblies with all the fuel pins with equal 
material composition and source strength, considering dif-
ferent values of:
• Initial enrichment: 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 4.5, 5.0%;
• Burnup: 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 60 GWd/tHM;
• Cooling time: 1, 5, 10, 50 years.
A total of 196 simulations resulted from all combinations of 
these parameters. The aim of these simulations is to assess 
the influence of the fuel irradiation history on the calculated 
Figure 2: Overview of the diversions scenarios considered in this study. The fuel pins are marked in grey, the dummy pins in white, and 
the guide tube positions in yellow. The percentage of dummy pins is mentioned for each scenario.
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detector responses. The fuel composition and source 
strength were taken from the SCK•CEN reference spent 
fuel library [21]. This library did not contain fuel assemblies 
with burnable poisons; therefore, the impact of this design 
characteristic could not be estimated at this stage.
3.2 Diversion scenarios
A second set of simulations considered twelve diversion sce-
narios, where some of the spent fuel pins were replaced by 
dummies made of stainless steel. The remaining spent fuel 
pins had equal material composition and source strength as 
in the case for complete fuel assemblies, whereas no source 
term was included in the dummy pins. The scenario with pin 
replacement is expected to be more difficult to detect com-
pared to the case of diversion without replacement.
The diversion scenarios are shown in Figure 2 and they 
cover cases with replacement between 50% and 15% of 
the total number of fuel pins. The fuel pins are depicted in 
grey, the dummy pins in white, and the guide tube posi-
tions in yellow. Most of the replacement occurs on the out-
er region of the fuel assembly, but also a chess-board pat-
tern (Diversion 1) and diversion from the inner section of 
the fuel assembly (Diversion 5) are included.
All simulations concerning the diversion scenarios consid-
ered fuel with a cooling time of 5 years, but the influence of 
the irradiation history was taken into account simulating 
fuel with different values of:
• Initial enrichment: 2.0, 3.5, 5.0%;
• Burnup: 10, 30, 60 GWd/tHM.
A total of 108 simulations were carried out in this set of 
simulations.
4. Machine learning models used for the data 
analysis
4.1 Introduction to machine learning
Machine learning is used nowadays for a broad range of 
applications such as speech recognition, financial fraud 
detection, and cancer prognosis. [22], [23], [24], [25], [26]
The machine learning models can be divided into two 
broad categories of supervised and unsupervised learning 
[27]. In the case of supervised learning the observations in 
the dataset have associated output values, whereas in the 
case of unsupervised learning the input data do not have 
corresponding output values.
A machine learning model for supervised learning is first 
developed during the training phase on a set of known in-
put and output data. Once the model is trained, it is used 
to predict (prediction phase) new input data for which the 
output data is unknown. The generic workflow for super-
vised learning is shown in Figure 3. The machine learning 
model developed by supervised learning uses regression 
or classification techniques depending on the type of out-
put data. Regression techniques are used to predict out-
put data that can assume continuous values (e.g. changes 
in temperature or pressure, fluctuations in housing prices), 
whereas classification techniques are used to classify in-
put data into categories that can assume only a limited set 
of values (e.g. type of fruit, benign/malign tumor). [9]
Figure 3: Generic workflow in case of supervised learning. The 
development of the machine learning model from known inputs 
and outputs is indicated as training phase, whereas the prediction 
of outputs from new inputs is referred to as prediction phase.
Independently from the machine learning algorithm cho-
sen, the data needed to develop a machine learning mod-
el is generally organized in a database. According to the 
machine learning terminology the records in the database 
are called observations and the input variables are called 
features or predictors. In case of supervised learning the 
output variables are called responses. Specific to classifi-
cation techniques, the responses can assume only a finite 
set of values (either in numerical or text format) called 
classes.
The detector responses calculated with the Monte Carlo 
simulations described in Section 3 were organized in a da-
tabase where the normalized average detector responses 
were the features and the percentage of replaced pins 
represented the response. Six classes were defined for the 
response, representing 50, 30, 25, 20, 15, and 0% of re-
placed pins. Therefore, each observation in the database 
consisted in 12 features and 1 response. An extract of the 
database for the NDA technique with the fuel assembly in 
air is shown in Table 1; the same database structure was 
used for the data with the fuel assembly in fresh water. 
Since each observation in the training database contained 
the corresponding response class, the detection of fuel 
pins diversion was treated as a supervised machine learn-
ing problem to be solved with classification techniques.
The accuracy of the models was calculated as the number 
of correct classifications in the whole dataset, and this 
metric was used to compare the different machine learn-
ing models developed.
26
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 58, June 2019
Features
Resp.Central det. positions Peripheral det. positions External det. positions
TH FA RES P TH FA RES P TH FA RES P
0.35 1.85 0.40 2.09 0.52 1.64 0.56 1.91 1.10 0.86 1.04 0.85 0
0.34 1.85 0.35 2.09 0.51 1.64 0.51 1.91 1.10 0.86 1.05 0.85 0
0.34 1.86 0.32 2.09 0.51 1.64 0.48 1.91 1.10 0.86 1.06 0.85 0
0.34 1.86 0.30 2.09 0.51 1.64 0.47 1.91 1.10 0.86 1.06 0.85 0
0.33 1.87 0.28 2.08 0.51 1.65 0.45 1.91 1.10 0.86 1.06 0.85 0
Table 1: Extract of the training database for the NDA technique with the fuel assembly in air.
4.2 Parameters chosen for the machine learning 
models
The machine learning models for this study were devel-
oped using the Classification Learner App that is part of 
the MATLAB Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox [28].
The toolbox offers the choice of several machine learning 
algorithms that can be used for supervised and unsuper-
vised learning problems. The Classification Learner App 
has a graphical user interface (GUI) that allows the user to 
select in the first window the training database, the varia-
bles to be used as features, and those to be used as 
responses.
The selection of the validation scheme used to assess the 
accuracy of the developed model is the next step in the 
GUI. The default MATLAB 5-fold cross-validation approach 
was chosen, where the training database is divided into 
five equal-sized subsections. As noted in [28], the valida-
tion scheme is used only for the estimation of the model 
accuracy; the final model is always trained using the com-
plete training database.
The next section in the GUI is the selection of the model 
type and model parameters, and the training of the 
model. Four main families of machine learning models 
were used for the data analysis: decision trees, discrimi-
nant analysis, support vector machines, and nearest 
neighbors classifiers. The principles of the models are 
described extensively in literature [28], [22], [9], [29], [30], 
[31]. The parameters used for each developed model are 
listed in Tables 2-5.
Model name
Maximum 
number of 
splits
Split criterion
Surrogate 
decision splits
Simple tree 5
Gini’s diversity 
index
Off
Medium tree 10
Gini’s diversity 
index
Off
Complex 
tree
30
Gini’s diversity 
index
Off
Table 2: Parameters chosen for the decision trees models.
Model name
Function used to 
separate classes
Covariance matrix
Linear discriminant Linear Diagonal
Quadratic 
discriminant
Quadratic Diagonal
Table 3: Parameters chosen for the discriminant analysis models.
Model name Kernel function
Box constraint 
level
Kernel scale 
mode
Manual 
kernel scale
Multiclass 
method
Standardize data
Linear SVM Linear 1 Auto ------ 1-vs-1 Yes
Quadratic SVM Quadratic 1 Auto ------ 1-vs-1 Yes
Cubic SVM Cubic 1 Auto ----- 1-vs-1 Yes
Coarse Gaussian SVM Gaussian 1 Manual 4 1-vs-1 Yes
Medium Gaussian SVM Gaussian 1 Manual 1 1-vs-1 Yes
Fine Gaussian SVM Gaussian 1 Manual 0.25 1-vs-1 Yes
Table 4: Parameters chosen for the support vector machine models. In the first three models the kernel scale mode was set to Auto, so 
the option Manual kernel scale was not used.
Model name Number of neighbors Distance metric Distance weight Standardize data
Coarse kNN 100 Euclidean Equal Yes
Medium kNN 10 Euclidean Equal Yes
Fine kNN 1 Euclidean Equal Yes
Cosine kNN 10 Cosine Equal Yes
Cubic kNN 10 Minkowski (cubic) Equal Yes
Weighted kNN 10 Euclidean Squared inverse Yes
Table 5: Parameters chosen for the nearest neighbors models.
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5. Results
5.1 NDA technique with fuel assembly in air
The classifier models described in Section 4.2 were ap-
plied to the detector responses for the NDA technique with 
the fuel assembly in air. The accuracies of all models de-
veloped using as features the detector responses from the 
external detector positions are shown in Table 6, whereas 
the results obtained using all input features are shown in 
Table 7. These results were selected because they repre-
sent the lowest and highest accuracies among the models 
developed.
The rows of Tables 6-7 indicate the names of the machine 
learning models, whereas the columns indicate the nor-
malized detector responses used for the analysis. As de-
scribed in Section 2.2 the detector responses refer to neu-
tron detectors sensitive to the thermal (TH), resonance 
(RES), or fast (FA) energy regions, and to the total gamma-
ray emission (P). One or more detector responses were 
considered in the analysis and are included in the table. In 
Table 6 only one feature per detector response was used, 
namely the average detector response from the detectors 
in the external positions. In Table 7 three separate features 
were used for each detector response, corresponding to 
the average values from the detectors in the central, pe-
ripheral, and external positions, respectively. The values in-
cluded in the table are the accuracy of each model, which 
is defined as the percentage of observations with correct 
classification. It was not possible at this stage to estimate 
the uncertainty of the calculated accuracy, but this topic 
will be addressed in future work.
The results of Table 6 indicate that the selection of the fea-
tures used as input variable in the model is important to 
obtain a reliable classification, and in general the use of the 
gamma-ray detector response leads to higher accuracy of 
the model compared to other detector types. This result is 
in line with previous research [8]. However, the addition of 
multiple features does not strongly improve the accuracy 
of the model in most of the cases.
Once the features used in the model are chosen, similar 
accuracies were obtained for most of the machine learning 
models applied in this study. However, “Linear discrimi-
nant”, “Coarse kNN”, and “Cosine kNN” models showed 
several cases where the accuracy was lower than 75%. 
Complete correct classifications were reached for the 
“Complex tree”, “Fine Gaussian SVM”, “Fine kNN”, and 
“Weighted kNN” models when the gamma-ray detector re-
sponse (P) was used as feature alone or in combination 
with the fast neutron detector response (FA).
The accuracies calculated for the machine learning models 
using the detector responses from all positions (i.e. central, 
peripheral, and external) are included in Table 7. Most of 
the conclusions drawn from the results in Table 6 are also 
applicable for Table 7, but in general the use of the detec-
tor responses from all available positions lead to an in-
crease in the model accuracy. The largest accuracies are 
obtained using the responses of detectors sensitive to fast 
neutrons or gamma-rays. Accuracies lower than 75% were 
obtained for all cases using “Fine Gaussian SVM” and 
“Coarse kNN” models except when the feature used was 
only the fast neutron detector response (FA) or the gam-
ma-ray detector response (P). Complete correct classifica-
tions were reached for several models, usually when the 
gamma-ray detector response (P) was used as feature ei-
ther alone or in combination with other features.
5.2 NDA technique with the fuel assembly 
in fresh water
Machine learning models based on the parameters de-
scribed in Section 4.2 were also developed from the de-
tector responses of the NDA technique with the fuel as-
sembly in fresh water. The accuracy for each model was 
computed and compared to the accuracy of the corre-
sponding model developed for the NDA technique with the 
fuel assembly in air. Tables 8-9 show the accuracy calcu-
lated using the detector responses from the external posi-
tions or from all positions, respectively.
The results in the tables show that in most of the cases the 
accuracy calculated for the fuel assembly kept either in air 
or in fresh water is within ±5%. Therefore, the comments 
reported in Section 5.1 are also valid in this Section. Focus-
ing on the cases where the difference in accuracy is larger 
than 5%, the accuracy for the NDA technique with the fuel 
assembly in fresh water is generally higher than the corre-
sponding value obtained with the fuel assembly in air. This 
is observed in Table 8 when the responses of detectors 
sensitive to thermal neutrons (TH) or resonance region neu-
trons (RES) are used as features alone or in combination. 
On the contrary, a decrease between 5 and 10% was ob-
served for several models when the responses of detectors 
sensitive to resonance region neutrons (RES) or fast neu-
trons (FA) are both used as features. Complete correct 
classifications were achieved using the “Fine Gaussian 
SVM” model with the (FA,P) features, the “Fine kNN” model 
using the (FA,P), (TH,FA,P), and (RES,FA,P) features, and 
the “Weighted kNN” model using the (FA,P) feature.
It is worth to note that for the NDA technique with the fuel 
assembly in fresh water no detector response alone is able 
to reach a complete correct classification using the detec-
tor positions located outside the fuel assembly. This is in 
contrast to the results obtained for the fuel assembly 
stored in air, where the gamma-ray detector response 
reached a complete correct classification with several ma-
chine learning models. The results obtained for the NDA 
technique with the fuel assembly in air are remarkable in 
the sense that they indicate that a passive gamma meas-
urement in air has the potential for a complete correct 
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classification. In addition, if neutron detectors such as fis-
sion chambers are not needed, it would significantly sim-
plify the design of a measurement device for spent fuel 
assay.
However, a safeguards verification underwater, like the one 
based on the PDET approach, is probably more realistic 
than a measurement in air, like the one based on the SIN-
RD approach.
Hence future work will be targeted at improving the accu-
racy of the current models to reach a complete correct 
classification also for the NDA technique with the fuel as-
sembly in fresh water.
Considering the accuracies calculated using all detector 
positions in Table 9, the largest difference between the 
NDA technique with the fuel assembly either in air or in 
fresh water were obtained using as input features the re-
sponses of detectors sensitive to thermal neutrons (TH) or 
resonance neutrons (RES) either alone or in combinations. 
An increase between 5 and 10% of the accuracy calculat-
ed with the fuel assembly in fresh water was obtained for 
decision tree and discriminant analysis models, whereas 
a decrease between -5% and -10% was obtained for “Lin-
ear SVM”, “Quadratic SVM”, and “Cubic SVM” models. 
Several models reached a complete correct classification 
using the NDA technique with the fuel stored in fresh wa-
ter, especially when the gamma-ray detector response (P) 
was used alone or in combinations with other detector 
responses.
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6. Conclusion
The detector responses of a set of detector types were 
modelled to assess the capability of machine learning 
models to detect the diversion of fuel pins from a fuel as-
sembly. Several machine learning models were developed 
and applied for the data analysis for an NDA technique 
with fuel assembly either in air or in fresh water.
The different models were evaluated in terms of accuracy, 
which was defined as the percentage of cases with cor-
rect classifications compared to the total dataset. The use 
of the NDA technique for a fuel assembly either in air or in 
fresh water was also compared using this metric.
The results for the NDA technique showed that the detec-
tor response used for the data analysis plays an important 
role in the accuracy of the model, and in general the gam-
ma-ray detector response obtained the highest accuracy 
compared to the neutron detector responses. However, 
the addition of multiple detector responses did not im-
prove significantly the accuracy of the models.
Comparing the use of the NDA technique for a fuel assem-
bly either in air or in fresh water, similar results in terms of 
accuracy were obtained for the majority of the models. 
Only in some cases the accuracy calculated with the fuel 
assembly in fresh water was more than 5% higher com-
pared to the value obtained with the fuel assembly in air.
Very promising results were obtained for the machine 
learning models using the decision trees, support vector 
machine, and nearest neighbors techniques. Several mod-
els reached a complete correct classification over the 
dataset used in this study, especially when the gamma-ray 
detector response was used alone or in combination with 
other features.
Future work will refine the models developed in this study 
by investigating different model parameters with the aim of 
increasing the accuracy of the current models. The uncer-
tainty of the calculated accuracy will also be estimated. In 
addition, the training database will be further expanded by 
generating several additional diversion scenarios and in-
cluding other detector responses to be used as input 
features.
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Abstract:
One of the instruments available to authority inspectors to 
measure and characterize the Cherenkov light emissions 
from irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in wet storage is 
the Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD). Based on 
the presence, characteristics and intensity of the 
Cherenkov light, the inspectors can verify that an assembly 
under study is not a dummy object, as well as perform 
partial defect verification of the assembly.
PWR assemblies are sometimes stored with a rod cluster 
control assembly (RCCA) inserted, which affects the 
Cherenkov light production and transport in the assembly. 
Such an insert will also block light from exiting the top of 
the fuel assembly, which will affect the light distribution 
and intensity of the Cherenkov light emissions. Whether or 
not this constitutes a  problem when verifying the 
assemblies for gross or partial defects with a DCVD has 
not previously been investigated thoroughly.
In this work, the Cherenkov light intensity of a PWR 17x17 
assembly with two different RCCA inserts were simulated 
and analysed, and compared to the Cherenkov light 
intensity from an assembly without an insert. For the 
studied assembly and insert types, the DCVD was found 
to be able to detect partial defects on the level of 50% in 
all studied cases with similar performance, though with 
a higher measurement uncertainty due to the reduced 
intensity when an RCCA insert is present. Consequently, 
for the studied assembly and insert types, assemblies with 
inserts can be verified with the same methodology as used 
for assemblies without inserts, with similar partial defect 
detection performance.
The simulation approach used also made it possible to 
investigate the minimum Cherenkov l ight intensity 
reduction resulting from partial defects of other levels than 
50%, in the PWR 17x17 fuel assembly with and without 
RCCA inserts. The results for the simulations without an 
insert were in agreement with previous results, despite 
differences in substitution patterns, substitution materials, 
modeling software and analysis approach.
Keywords: DCVD; partial defect verification; Rod cluster 
control assembly, Cherenkov light; Geant4
1. Introduction
One of the many safeguards inspection tasks undertaken 
by authority inspectors is to measure irradiated nuclear 
fuel assemblies to verify that all nuclear material is present 
and accounted for. To aid the inspectors, a multitude of in-
struments has been developed. One of the instruments 
available is the Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD), 
which measures the Cherenkov light produced in the wa-
ter surrounding an assembly. The characteristics and qual-
ity of the Cherenkov light can be used to perform gross 
defect verification, verifying that the assembly under study 
is a spent nuclear fuel and not a dummy object. The DCVD 
is more frequently used for partial defect verification, veri-
fying that 50% or more of the rods in an assembly have 
not been diverted. In such a verification, the Cherenkov 
light intensity emitted by the assembly is integrated to pro-
vide a value corresponding to the total light intensity of the 
assembly. Based on earlier simulations, it is estimated that 
a 50% substitution of irradiated fuel rods in an assembly 
with non-radioactive steel rods will decrease the total 
Cherenkov light intensity of the assembly by at least 
30% [1]. Hence, by comparing the measured intensities to 
predicted ones, assembly intensities deviating more than 
30% can be identified. Recent prediction methods ac-
count for the irradiation history of the assembly, i.e. its cy-
cle-wise burnup and cooling time, as well as the physical 
design of the assembly [2]. Any assembly having an inten-
sity deviating more than 30% from expected is flagged as 
an outlier, and further investigations and measurements 
are called for to confirm whether the assembly is subject 
to a partial defect, or if the deviation is caused by some-
thing else such as erroneous declarations.
PWR assemblies in wet storage are in some cases stored 
with inserts, such as a  rod cluster control assembly 
(RCCA) insert. For such storage cases, the neutron ab-
sorber rods of the RCCA are stored inserted into the guide 
tubes of PWR fuels. This can help save storage space, 
since no additional space is needed to store the RCCA. In 
addition, when inserted into a fuel assembly, the RCCA 
helps ensure sufficient limits to criticality. Before placing 
spent nuclear fuel in a difficult-to-access storage, the as-
semblies must be verified for partial defects [3]. It is rea-
sonable to assume that the fuel assemblies will be verified 
Verifying PWR assemblies with rod cluster control 
assembly inserts using a DCVD
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in their current state, with any RCCA inserts still present 
during the verification measurements.
The presence of an RCCA is believed to affect the Cheren-
kov light in such fuel assemblies in two ways. Firstly, it pre-
vents Cherenkov light from being created in the guide 
tubes, as the water inside the guide tubes is substituted by 
absorber material. Secondly, the RCCA will partly cover 
the top of the assembly, preventing a significant fraction of 
Cherenkov light from exiting the assembly to be detected.
Against this background, the objectives with this work is to 
i) verify the 30% intensity reduction limits of [1] for a 50% 
partial defect using different simulations codes and partial 
defect scenarios, since the limit in [1] is an estimate 
based on 30% rod substitutions. And ii) investigate how 
RCCA inserts affect the 30% intensity reduction limit as-
sumed for a 50% partial defect level. As a consequence of 
the methodology chosen to investigate this, it becomes 
possible to also to study the minimum Cherenkov light re-
duction resulting from other partial defect levels, ranging 
from 0-100% substitution of the irradiated rods in an 
assembly.
2. Simulating the effect of top plates and 
inserts
To simulate DCVD images of PWR 17x17 assemblies, the 
three-step method of [4] has been used. These three steps 
are:
1. In the first step, the gamma emission spectrum of the 
assembly is simulated using ORIGEN-ARP [5]. In princi-
ple, beta decays may contribute, but their contribution 
has been shown in [2] to be minor and they were there-
fore neglected here.
2. In the second step, the gamma transport and interac-
tion in a  fuel assembly geometry is simulated using 
Geant4 [6], using a simulation toolkit based on [7]. In 
this process, Cherenkov light is created and transport-
ed to the top of the assembly. Once a Cherenkov pho-
ton reaches the top of the assembly, its position and di-
rection is saved. The simulation model considers the 
full 3-D geometry and axial burnup distribution of the 
assembly.
3. In the third step, the saved photons are projected onto 
an imaging plane, using a pinhole camera model, to 
simulate a DCVD image.
Note that in the second step, the top plate, lifting handle 
and other structures at the assembly top are not included. 
The effect of these structures are instead included in the 
third step. This allows for the computationally expensive 
second step to be run only once, and different top plates 
and other structures at the assembly top can quickly be 
simulated in the third step. The effects of the top struc-
tures are studied by applying a mask, detailing where 
structure material is preventing the Cherenkov light from 
exiting the fuel assembly, and where light can pass 
through to be detected.
It was found in [4] that the burnup and cooling time of an 
assembly will not strongly influence the light distribution in 
a simulated image. For burnups of 10-40 MWd/kgU and 
cooling times of 1-40 years the total intensity of the simu-
lated image will change at most 1% due to the changing 
light distribution. Consequently, in this work one PWR 
17x17 assembly with a burnup of 40 MWd/kgU and a cool-
ing time of 10 years was chosen, which is expected to be 
representative for assemblies with other burnups and 
cooling times. Using ORIGEN-ARP, the gamma spectrum 
of the assembly was simulated in the first step, and in the 
second step the gamma emissions from the fission prod-
ucts were simulated in a fuel geometry. Two different ge-
ometries were simulated: one where all guide tubes were 
filled with water, corresponding to the absence of an in-
sert, and one where all guide tubes were filled with In-Ag-
Cd, corresponding to control rod material. Depending on 
the design of the RCCA, some or all guide tubes will con-
tain absorber material. By applying the top plate mask to 
the simulations without control rods and with control rods, 
the extreme values are found for the Cherenkov light inten-
sity in the simulated images. The case of some guide 
tubes containing control rods are expected to fall between 
these extreme values.
In the simulations of the second step, the light contribution 
from each rod in the assembly was stored separately. 
Thus, it was easy to include only the light contributions 
from selected rods in the final image. This facilitates stud-
ies of partial defect verification, where irradiated fuel rods 
are substituted by non-irradiated rods with similar density 
containing natural uranium, depleted uranium or low en-
riched uranium. Using this approach, it is thus possible to 
investigate the resulting total Cherenkov light intensity as 
a function of various rod substitution patterns, and to as-
sess the DCVD capability to detect such substitutions.
2.1 Masks used
To obtain a mask representing the regions of the assembly 
covered by the top plate, a photograph of a PWR assem-
bly top plate was used. Using the photograph, the covered 
regions could be manually identified and traced, and con-
verted into a binary mask. The photograph and the result-
ing mask obtained is shown in Figure 1.
Two different RCCA inserts were studied in this work. For 
the two RCCA inserts, DCVD images of assemblies with in-
serts were used to identify which additional regions were 
covered. This information was used to manually design 
a mask for assemblies with such inserts. One of the stud-
ied inserts had a comparatively large frame for holding the 
control rods, and consequently covered a substantial frac-
tion of the assembly top, as seen to the left in Figure 2. This 
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RCCA will be referred to as the “thick insert” in this work. 
The other studied insert had much finer features, and was 
relatively more open, as can be seen to the right in Fig-
ure 2. This insert will be referred to as the “thin insert” in 
this work. The thin insert is likely the insert described in [8].
3. Sensitivity of DCVD verification of partial 
defect in assemblies with inserts
The effect on the total Cherenkov light intensity of substi-
tuting irradiated rods with non-radioactive rods is shown in 
Figure 3. These values show the minimum Cherenkov light 
intensity reduction for partial defects of a given magnitude. 
In order to find the most challenging partial defect case to 
detect, the rods were substituted in an order reflecting 
their contribution to the total light intensity, starting with re-
placement of the least significant rod. The rod substitution 
pattern was estimated individually for the studied cases 
based on the identification of the fuel rods contributing the 
least to the total intensity, and the patterns thus differ be-
tween the cases. Hence, Figure 3 shows the minimum in-
tensity reduction in the total Cherenkov light intensity for 
various levels of partial defects, with replacement rods 
having similar gamma attenuation as the original rod and 
otherwise identical properties. Thus, for all other substitu-
tion scenarios, the intensity reduction will be larger and 
should be easier to detect.
As mentioned, there are different RCCA designs. In some 
cases, fuel assemblies with RCCA inserts may have control 
Figure 1 Left: a photograph of the top structure of an assembly model. Right: the mask created based on the photograph, to indicate 
which regions are covered by the top plate and lifting handle.
Figure 2 Left: The top plate mask with the addition of the thick RCCA insert, covering a substantial part of the assembly top. Right: the 
top plate mask with the addition of a second, thin type of RCCA insert, having smaller features and covering relatively less compared to 
the mask on the left. A picture of this insert can be found in [8].
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rods inserted into all guide tubes, while in other cases only 
some of the guide tubes have control rods while others are 
water-filled. To investigate the impact of this variability on the 
light intensity, the masks from Figure 2 were applied to the 
simulated fuel assembly with all control rods present, and to 
the fuel assembly with only water-filled rods in the guide 
tube positions. The results for an assembly with an RCCA 
insert having control rods at only some of the available posi-
tions are expected to fall between the results of these two 
cases. The results show that as the control rods are re-
moved, the light reduction due to a partial defect increases 
slightly. For both types of RCCA inserts, the light reduction 
could be up to 1 percent unit higher if the control rods are 
missing, as compared to if all control rods are present, 
shown in figure Figure 3. Hence, the case of an RCCA with 
a full complement of control rods is the most challenging 
one, and can conservatively be used to estimate the mini-
mum light intensity reduction that a partial defect in an as-
sembly with a RCCA causes.
No  
insert
Thick 
insert
Thin 
insert
Intensity reduction 27% 27% 29%
Table 1: Cherenkov light intensity reduction at a  50% partial 
defect level for the studied partial defect cases.
In [1], partial defect detection using the DCVD was studied 
using simulations. Partial defect levels of 30% (where fuel 
rods were substituted with stainless steel rods) were stud-
ied, with resulting reductions in total Cherenkov light ranging 
from 15% to 40% depending on the diversion pattern. In [1], 
it was also estimated that a 50% partial defect would result 
in at least a 30% intensity reduction. For the case studied 
here, where partial defects on the level of 30% (where fuel 
rods are substituted with natural uranium, depleted uranium 
or low-enriched uranium) are modelled, it is found that the 
Cherenkov light intensity will be reduced by at least 10%. 
Partial defects on the level of 50% gives a Cherenkov light 
intensity reduction of at least 27%, as seen in Table 1 . Both 
studies hence give rather similar results, despite using dif-
ferent substitution patterns, substitution materials, modeling 
software and analysis approach.
For the cases of RCCA inserts, the DCVD verification 
methodology is found to actually be slightly more sensitive 
to a 50% partial defect, compared to the case of no insert, 
since the total Cherenkov light reduction is slightly higher. 
For the thick insert (Figure 2 left), the intensity reduction is 
at least 27%, and for the thin insert (Figure 2 right) the in-
tensity reduction is at least 29%. Hence, for partial defects 
at the 50% level, the same partial defect detection criteria 
in terms of required light intensity reduction can be used 
for both the insert case as in the non-insert case.
The reason for the higher sensitivity in the RCCA case has 
to do with the light distribution in a DCVD image. Since the 
light emitted by the assembly is highly collimated, the cen-
tral region vertically below the DCVD will be the brightest, 
and regions further away will appear dimmer. Consequently, 
in an image without an insert, a rod in the central region will 
contribute more, in relative terms, to the total Cherenkov 
light intensity, as compared to a  rod near the edge. In 
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Figure 3: Reduction in Cherenkov light intensity as a function of the fraction of rods replaced with non-radioactive substitutes. Rods 
contributing the least to the total intensity were removed first, and accordingly the rod substitution pattern differs in all three cases.
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addition, since the lifting handle covers the edges, the inten-
sity contribution from a  rod at the edge is further sup-
pressed. When an RCCA is present, it will cover large parts 
of the central region, and consequently suppress the inten-
sity from the otherwise brightest regions at the center. As 
a result, the distribution of light over the measurement im-
age will be more even, and the relative intensity contribu-
tions from the rods will vary less when an RCCA is present.
For the studied cases with and without an RCCA insert, 
the DCVD verification methodology is least sensitive to 
substitution of rods near the assembly edge. As noted 
above, this is a combined effect of the collimation and of 
the lifting handle obstructing the view. For the more cen-
trally located rods, the contribution per rod to the total in-
tensity varies significantly, depending on which parts that 
are covered by the RCCA insert. Thus, for partial defect on 
the order of 50%, the rod substitution pattern that is most 
challenging to detect using the DCVD, will differ depending 
on the presence or absence of an RCCA insert, and will be 
different for RCCA of different designs.
While the inserts do not significantly change the intensity 
reduction limits, they do change the total Cherenkov light 
intensity of the image. The simulated total intensity reduc-
tion for the two RCCA cases is compared to the non-insert 
case in Table 2. As can be seen, the insert will significantly 
reduce the intensity of the Cherenkov light reaching the 
DCVD detector, and consequently the measurement un-
certainties in the RCCA insert case will be higher, for oth-
erwise identical assemblies. Thus, care must be taken 
when verifying low-intensity assemblies with inserts. With-
out inserts such assemblies may have a sufficiently high 
Cherenkov light intensity to be verified for a 50% partial 
defect level, but with an RCCA present, the intensity may 
be too low to allow for an accurate measurement, and thus 
an accurate verification. For the case of a RCCA insert 
with only a few control rods, the relative intensity is slightly 
higher, and can increase up to 40% for the thick insert and 
up to 50% for the thin insert (an increase with 3 percent-
age points in both cases). These values are similar enough 
that the assemblies can be readily compared, even if their 
RCCA inserts contain a different number of control rods, 
as long as the physical design of the top of the RCCA is 
the same. The main cause of the change in Cherenkov 
light intensity in the RCCA case is that more parts of the 
top of the assembly are covered, the effect of having 
RCCA inserts with differing number of control rods is less 
significant.
No insert Thick 
insert
Thin 
insert
Relative intensity 100% 37% 47%
Table 2: Relative measured Cherenkov light intensity for an 
assembly without an RCCA insert and for the same assembly with 
a thick respectively a thin insert present. The values are scaled so 
that the intensity of the no-insert case is 100%.
4. Conclusions and outlook
PWR assemblies in wet storage can be stored with an 
RCCA inserted, which will alter the characteristics and de-
tected total intensity of the Cherenkov light produced in-
side the assembly. This work has investigated the partial 
defect detection capability of the DCVD for one PWR 
17x17 fuel assembly. A regular fuel assembly has been 
modelled, as well as the same fuel assembly with two dif-
ferent kinds of RCCA inserts. The minimum expected re-
duction in total Cherenkov light has then been modelled 
for partial defects ranging from 0% to 100% for the fuel as-
sembly without as well as with RCCA inserts. The substi-
tution scenario considered is that the irradiated rods are 
replaced by non-irradiated rods, having identical gamma 
attenuation properties. Such replacement rods could for 
example be made of low-enriched uranium, natural urani-
um or depleted uranium.
The simulation results indicate that the studied partial de-
fect scenarios affects assemblies with and without RCCA 
inserts in a similar way. Consequently, the currently adopt-
ed partial defect verification method using the DCVD can 
be used also to verify partial defects also in the case of as-
semblies with inserts, with similar partial defect detection 
performance. Furthermore, the previously established de-
tection requirement of a 30% reduction in the measured 
Cherenkov light intensity (for a partial defect level of 50%) 
compared to the predicted one, can be applied also to the 
RCCA insert cases. Some RCCA inserts do not have con-
trol rods in all available positions, but the simulation results 
show that this has a comparatively small effect on the total 
Cherenkov light intensity, and does not pose any addition-
al problems to the verification methodology.
For the studied PWR 17x17 assembly, the rods closest to 
the edges contribute the least to the detected Cherenkov 
light intensity. This is due to the collimation of the Cherenk-
ov light, coupled with the positioning of the DCVD during 
a measurement, and due to the lifting handle covering rod 
positions around the edges of the fuel assembly. It may be 
possible to compensate for the collimation by performing 
measurements with the DCVD aligned over the edges of 
the assembly. Alternatively, it may be possible to model the 
effect of the collimation on the light distribution in an im-
age, and use that information to compensate for the colli-
mation effect. Both these procedures could potentially in-
crease the DCVD verification methodology sensitivity to 
rod substitution near the assembly edges. However, care 
must be taken to consider Cherenkov light produced in an 
assembly due to radiation originating in neighbouring as-
semblies, since such radiation will not travel far to reach 
a neighbouring assembly, and will hence predominately 
create Cherenkov light near the edges of an assembly.
In addition to RCCA inserts, assemblies may be stored 
with other inserts, such as a  f low stoppers. The 
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methodology developed here could be applied to assess 
how such an insert affects the partial defect sensitivity of 
the DCVD verification methodology. Ideally, all types of in-
serts that frequently occur should be investigated in this 
way, to ensure that the standard DCVD verification proce-
dure will accurately verify such assemblies.
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Abstract:
In the last years, a  database of simulated spent fuel 
observables was developed at SCK•CEN by combining 
the results of depletion-evolution codes and the responses 
of several detectors obtained by Monte Carlo models. We 
analysed the large amount of generated data with Artificial 
Neural Networks, by using the MATLAB toolbox.
In this paper we focus on the application of Artificial Neural 
Networks to simulated Self-Interrogation Neutron 
Resonance Densitometry observables with the aim to 
quantify the 239Pu content in spent fuel. In view of a realistic 
application of the method, the number of data in the 
training and validation sets was limited to 20 spent fuel 
assemblies; the obtained performance when using 
randomly selected spent fuel assembly was compared 
with the one obtained when the spent fuel assemblies 
were selected by expert judgement. The average deviation 
between the nominal 239Pu content and the calculated 
239Pu content in the testing data set was 0.2% with 
a standard deviation of 3.5% and a maximum deviation of 
10%.
It was found that the selection of spent fuel assemblies 
based on expert judgement results in better performances 
and therefore speeds up the data analysis when compared 
to a pure random selection of the data; hence the term 
natural, as opposite to artificial, is present in the title of the 
paper.
Keywords: Spent Fuel; Non Destructive Analysis observa-
bles; Artificial neural networks; Self-Interrogation Neutron 
Resonance Densitometry; Large Data sets
1. Introduction
Non-destructive assay (NDA) of spent fuel assemblies 
(SFA), either for safeguards verification purposes or for 
safety aspects related to nuclear fuel cycle, relies often on 
the detection of neutron and gamma radiation spontane-
ously emitted by the spent fuel [1]. Gamma radiation is 
mainly emitted by fission products and therefore its meas-
urement does not represent a direct assay of the quantity 
of fissile material present in the SFA. Neutron radiation is 
originating mainly from spontaneous fission decay and 
α-decay via (α,n) reactions on oxygen isotopes. The decay 
of actinides such as Cm isotopes represents the main 
source of such neutron radiation which can then undergo 
subsequent multiplication in the fissile material of the fuel. 
Therefore, also the observables associated to neutron 
measurements on SFA do not represent a direct assay of 
the quantity of fissile material present in the SFA, unless 
one is able to determine the multiplication and relate that 
to the residual fissile mass [2].
In this framework, and in relation to increased verification 
needs associated to the imminent start of operation of ge-
ological repositories [3,4], R&D on NDA intensified in the 
last decade [5,6,7,8,9]. One of the techniques that was 
studied is the Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Den-
sitometry (SINRD) [10,11]. The observables associated to 
this technique are directly related to the quantity of 239Pu in 
the fuel and therefore have the potential to provide means 
for a direct quantification of the 239Pu amount in a SFA.
The use of the SINRD technique and the data analysis of 
the associated observables by means of artificial neural 
network (ANN) [12,13] is described in the paper.
2. Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance 
Densitometry observables
The SINRD technique [10] is a NDA technique for the direct 
quantification of 239Pu. The total neutron cross-section of 
239Pu shows a strong resonance around 0.3 eV and the at-
tenuation of the neutron flux around the 0.3 eV energy re-
gion is used to directly quantify the 239Pu mass. The pas-
sive neutron emission from spent fuel is measured with 
fission chambers bare or wrapped with different absorbers 
as follows:
• Cd wrapped 235U fission chamber, insensitive to thermal 
neutrons
• Bare 235U fission chamber, mainly sensitive to thermal 
neutrons
• Bare 238U fission chamber, mainly sensitive to fast 
neutrons
• 239Pu fission chamber covered by Gd foil, sensitive to 
neutrons with energy > 0.1 eV
• 239Pu fission chamber covered by Cd foil, sensitive to 
neutrons with energy > 1 eV
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The observables of interest are two; the first one is the 
SINRD signature RSI, defined as the ratio between the neu-
tron count by the 238U fission chamber (CFAST) and the 
count differences in the Gd and Cd wrapped 239Pu loaded 
fission chamber (CGd-CCd); the second one is the ratio be-
tween CFAST and the count differences in the bare and the 
Cd wrapped a 235U fission chambers (CTH).
As explained in [14] the estimated uncertainty due to 
counting statistics for a measurement time of 1 h is strong-
ly dependent on the burnup of the spent fuel assembly. 
This estimated uncertainty is lower than 5% for fuel with 
3.5% initial enrichment, 5 years of cooling time, and burn-
up larger than 15 GWd/tHM [14]. The use of 
239Pu fission 
chambers enhances the sensitivity of the technique to 
239Pu content [11].
The two observables were estimated by means of Monte 
Carlo simulations with the code MCNPX 2.7.0 [15], the ra-
dionuclide composition of the fuel was taken from the 
spent fuel library developed at SCK•CEN [16,17,18]. Two 
observables, RSI and CFAST/CTH, were determined for a total 
of 2940 cases of the spent fuel library [19].
The obtained results [7] for 17x17 PWR SFA indicated that 
SINRD can only be applied in dry conditions and that cali-
bration curves can be determined to quantify 239Pu provid-
ed that initial enrichment (IE) is known.
Figure 1 shows the RSI observable as a function of 
239Pu 
content for different values of IE and BU. If the burnup (BU) 
is above 30 GWd/tHM the data cluster around an almost 
straight line and there is a strong correlation between RSI 
and 239Pu content irrespective if the IE. For burnup below 
30 GWd/tHM the data exhibit a more scattered behaviour. 
This is due the fact that at lower BU values the presence of 
235U interferes due to the presence of a weak resonance at 
about the same energy as the one of 239Pu.
The ratio CFAST/CTH, shown in Fig. 2, can be used to deter-
mine the IE if the BU is less than 30 GWd/tHM and to ac-
count for the interference from 235U. The ratio RSI is almost 
independent from the cooling time (CT) up to CT of 300 
years, while the ratio CFAST/CTH starts to decrease from not 
less than 10 years (Fig. 3).
Figure 1: RSI as function of 
239Pu amount for any BU values and 
for BU values of at least 30 GWd/tHM. CT was 5 years and IE 
between 2% and 5%.
Figure 2: CFAST/CTH as a function of IE for any BU values and a CT 
of 5 years. The results for BU values of less than 30 GWd/tHM are 
highlighted in a different colour.
43
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 58, June 2019
Figure 3: RSI and CFAST/CTH as a function of CT. The data are for an IE of 2% and BU of 30 GWd/tHM.
Figure 4: Architecture of the Neural network considered in this work.
3. Data analysis with artificial neural networks
3.1 Artificial Neural Networks
In addition to the above mentioned approach, we decided 
to investigate the use of artificial neural networks [12] as 
mean to determine the 239Pu quantity given the two ob-
servables RSI and CFAST/CTH.
An ANN can be described as a network in which each 
node (or neuron) i processes the n input units it is connect-
ed to through a transfer (or activation) function fi :
 y f w xi i
j
n
ij j i= −





⋅
=
∑
1
( )q  (1)
where yi is the output of neuron i, xj is the j-th input to node 
i, wij is the weight of the connection between input j and 
node i, and qi is the threshold (or bias) of the node. While 
each neuron i can have its own transfer function in our im-
plementation [13, 20] the same transfer function was used 
for all the neurons in a given layer.
Neural networks have a multilayer architecture consisting 
of one layer for input neurons, one or more inner layers of 
neurons (also called hidden layers), and one layer for out-
put neurons. The architecture chosen in this work is repre-
sented in Fig. 4 and consists up to three hidden layers. 
The number of nodes in the input layer is indicated with I, 
the number of nodes in the hidden layer number k is indi-
cated with Hk, and the number of nodes in the output layer 
is indicated with O.
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In this architecture, the input variables (Observables) are 
linearly scaled between -1 and +1 before being fed to the 
ANN. Sigmoid functions are used to connect the neurons 
in the input layer to the neurons in the first hidden layer, as 
well as to connect the neurons in the different hidden lay-
ers. Linear functions are used to connect the neurons in 
the last hidden layer to the neurons in the output layer. Fi-
nally the output from the neurons of the output layer is 
transformed into the output variable (239Pu mass) with the 
inverse of the linear scaling function used for the consid-
ered observables.
The database of simulated observables and spent fuel 
characteristics is divided in three sets, corresponding to 
training, validation and testing. The training process of 
a neural network is an iterative process where the weights 
and biases of each neuron are adapted as result of the 
predictive error. Using an initial set of weights and biases, 
the training set is used by the training algorithm to calcu-
late the predictive error and to adapt the weights and bias-
es of the neurons. The predictive error is also computed 
for the validation set for each iteration during the training 
process. The predictive error for the training set and vali-
dation set normally decreases with the number of itera-
tions but, as the network begins to overfit the dataset, the 
error in the validation set tends to increase. The weights 
and biases of the neurons in the trained network are those 
obtained for the minimum value of the predictive error in 
the validation set. The testing set is finally used to deter-
mine the accuracy of the trained ANN and to evaluate its 
capability to predict results from data it was not trained 
with. [21] 
3.2 Data analysis of SINRD signatures
We considered only SINRD observables for cases with CT 
of 5 years, given the weak dependence on the CT up to 
a CT value of 10 years. The dataset is therefore reduced to 
98 entries associated to 14 values of BU and 7 IE.
The size of the data set is relatively small when compared 
to the large data sets that are usually used when training 
an ANN; however, this is in line with the fact that, in view of 
a deployment of the ANN with experimental data, the data 
set would also not be large when considering realistic 
combinations of IE and BU values.
Starting from Eq. (1) we estimated the number of parame-
ters of the ANN that need to be estimated during the train-
ing procedure as a function of the network structure. The 
results are shown in Table 1 and indicate the number N of 
parameters as a function of the number of nodes I in the 
input layer, the number of nodes Hk in the hidden layer 
number k, and the number of nodes O in the output layer. 
Different configurations with k between one and three 
were considered with a minimum level of complexity, in 
view of the limited availability of training data.
In this work we use an architecture where the two observ-
ables enter the input layer, and the 239Pu amount is the 
only quantity in the output layer. Therefore for our case I=2, 
representing the two SINRD observables, and O=1, repre-
senting the 239Pu amount.
In practice, the data processing with ANN consists in iden-
tifying a ANN configuration that describes the dependence 
of 239Pu varies in the space of the variable CFAST/CTH and 
RSI.
I H1 H2 H3 O N
2 3 1 13
2 2 2 1 15
2 2 2 2 1 21
Table 1: Number n of the ANN parameters to be determined as 
a function of the network architecture.
For a given ANN configuration, there is a level of arbitrarity 
when choosing the size of training, testing and validation. 
In our case, given the limited size of the whole database 
and the limited possibilities to carry out actual measure-
ment we decided to limit the size of the training and valida-
tion set to 10 entries each; the rest of the database was 
used for testing.
Since the number N of the network parameters should not 
exceed the size of the training and validation data set we 
opted for a network with two hidden layers with two nodes 
each. The choice of two layers stems from previous expe-
rience where we learned that better performance can be 
achieved when the number of layers is increased [13, 20].
The analysis of the data was carried with a tool [20] devel-
oped in MATLAB [22]; the tool allows to carry out the anal-
ysis through a graphical user interface (GUI); through this 
GUI the user can import data from a text file, filter the data 
based on certain criteria, define the network architecture 
and several optimization options such as internal process-
ing functions, performance function and training function 
[20]. The results and network configuration can be export-
ed. The tool allows training with random or fixed initial val-
ues for weights and offset. Also the entries of the database 
to be used for training, validation can be chosen randomly 
by the programme or by the user via flags associated to 
entries in the database.
In our analysis, the optimization of the ANN through the 
quantity mean square error (mse)
 mse
N
A A
k
N
k calc k= −( )
=
∑ ,1
1
2
 (2)
Where Ak,calc is the value of the parameter as determined 
by the ANN in the output layer, Ak is the nominal value of 
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the parameter. After each iteration (also called epoch) the 
weights and biases of the nodes were updated according 
to the Levenberg-Marquardt [23,24,25] or Bayesian regu-
larization [26,27] algorithms as implemented in Matlab with 
the trainlm and trainbr functions, respectively. The value of 
the parameters used in the both algorithms are included in 
Table 2.
Maximum number of epochs 105
Maximum time to train (in seconds) 1000
Network performance goal 0
Minimum performance gradient 10-7
Maximum value for the Marquardt adjustment 
parameter (mu)
1010
Table 2: Parameters used for the training algorithms.
In our analysis we tested the option not to include the scal-
ing function described in Fig. 4 between observables and 
input layer and between output layer and output variables. 
This test resulted in worse values of the mse when com-
pared with an analysis that include this scaling step.
3.3 Results
Initially we kept random initial values for weights and offset 
as well as the entries of the database to be used for train-
ing, testing and validation. We observed a large variation in 
the number of epochs before the training timing ended as 
well as a variation of several orders of magnitude in terms 
of mse.
We realized that it is impossible to identify the configura-
tion with the minimum mse based on a random or sequen-
tial selection of the database entries. Assuming that the 
assignment of an entry to the validation or training data set 
does not matter, with 20 entries in 98 this would corre-
spond to
n
k
n
k n k
!
! !
!
! !
~



 = −( ) = ( ) ×
98
20 78
3 1020
combinations.
With the used data analysis tool, both the initial values for 
weights and offset as well as the entries for training and 
testing can be defined by the user or chosen randomly.
Since weights and offset define the ANN to be trained, the 
choice of the initial values of weights and offset was kept 
random.
We then tried to identify, by expert judgement and hence 
natural intelligence, the entries of the database. The choice 
of the entries was carried out by studying how the 239Pu 
varies in the space of the variable CFAST/CTH and RSI. This is 
shown in Fig. 5.
Figure 5: 239Pu amount as a function of RSI and CFAST/CTH.  
The number indicate the corresponding entry in the considered 
data set.
The data in Fig. 5 reveal that CFAST/CTH and RSI have a limited 
range of variation and lie in specific domain. As explained 
before, we are looking for a ANN configuration that de-
scribes the dependence of 239Pu in the space of the varia-
bles CFAST/CTH and RSI. Given the results in Fig. 5, it was logi-
cal to assume that entries to use in the training and 
validation data set should lie at the boundary of the domain 
of CFAST/CTH and SINRD. In addition, it seemed logical that 
a sufficient number of them should lie inside the area in or-
der to allow to describe the shape over the domain of CFAST/
CTH and RSI.
Based on these criteria, we defined the entries for the train-
ing validation data set as indicated in the Table 3 and Fig. 6. 
It is worth to comment that the entries indicated in italic, al-
though present in the spent fuel library, are not realistic 
since the BU is too high for the chosen IE. These entries 
were nevertheless considered to assess the performance of 
the method in a configuration where all the entries of the da-
tabase of spent fuel library observables can be used.
The training was then repeated one hundred times to try 
different initial values for weights and offset.
It was found initial values for weights and offset can affect 
the mse up to two order of magnitude; this corresponds to 
about 1 order of magnitude change in the resulting 239Pu 
mass standard deviation.
The best obtained value of mse was 2.3×104. The square 
root of mse corresponds to a standard deviation between 
declared and predicted of 239Pu about 150 g. Changing 
the training function between trainlm and trainbr did not 
seem to affect the results.
The deviation between the predicted 239Pu mass and the 
value in the data base is shown in Fig. 7, where the entries 
used for training, validation and testing are shown with dif-
ferent colours.
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ID Flag BU IE CT ID Flag BU IE CT
1 T 5 2 5 5 V 25 2 5
28 T 70 2.5 5 29 V 5 3 5
31 T 15 3 5 35 V 35 3 5
59 T 15 4 5 45 V 15 3.5 5
63 T 35 4 5 57 V 5 4 5
75 T 25 4.5 5 64 V 40 4 5
78 T 40 4.5 5 70 V 70 4 5
85 T 5 5 5 87 V 15 5 5
89 T 25 5 5 91 V 35 5 5
95 T 55 5 5 93 V 45 5 5
Table 3: Selected entries for training (T) and validation (V) data sets.
Figure 6: Training, validation and testing data sets.
Figure 7: Percentage deviation between predicted and nominal 
239Pu amount for training, validation and testing data sets.
In the testing data set, the average deviation between the 
nominal 239Pu content and the calculated one was 0.2% 
with a standard deviation of 3.5% and a maximum devia-
tion of 10%.
4.  Conclusions
We described a data analysis approach based on artificial 
neural networks (ANN) to process the observables associ-
ated to the SINRD technique. The SINRD observables 
were obtained with Monte Carlo based simulations using 
fuel composition from a spent fuel library and represent 
a data set of nearly 3,000 entries.
Given the fact that the SINRD observables are not de-
pending on cooling time up to a cooling time of 10 years, 
we restricted the analysis to the 98 entries with a cooling 
time of 5 years.
While the choice of the initial values of weights and offset 
was kept random, we identified by expert judgement and 
hence natural intelligence, the 20 entries of the database 
to be used for training and validation. The obtained results 
reveal that, the average deviation between the nominal 
239Pu content and the calculated one was 0.2% with 
a standard deviation of 3.5% and a maximum deviation of 
10%.
The selection of spent fuel assemblies based on expert 
judgement is not necessarily the best, in terms of ANN 
precision, but allowed to resolve quickly a problem that 
would have not been possible to solve by selecting on 
a  randomly the database entries for training and 
validation.
Future work will focus on possibly reducing even further 
the size of the data base for training and validation and lim-
iting only on realistic cases of the library of observables. In 
addition, we would like to study a different form of the per-
formance function for example accounting for the relative 
deviations rather than absolute deviations. We would like 
also to analyse data with different cooling times by includ-
ing an additional observables from the observable data-
base in the data analysis.
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Abstract:
Sandia National Laboratories is developing a  way to 
visualize molecular changes that indicate penetration of 
a  tamper-indicating enclosure (TIE). Such “bleeding” 
materials (analogous to visually obvious, colorful bruised 
skin that doesn’t heal) allows inspectors to use simple 
visual observation to readily recognize that penetration into 
a material used as a TIE has been attempted, without 
providing adversaries the ability to repair damage. Such 
a material can enhance the current capability for TIEs, 
used to support treaty verification regimes. Current 
approaches rely on time-consuming and subjective visual 
assessment by an inspector, external equipment, such as 
eddy current or camera devices, or active approaches that 
may be limited due to application environment. The 
complexity of securing whole volumes includes: (1) 
enclosures that are non-standard in size/shape; (2) 
enclosures that may be inspectorate- or facility-owned; (3) 
tamper attempts that are detectable but difficult or timely 
for an inspector to locate; (4) the requirement for solutions 
that are robust regarding reliability and environment 
(including facility handling); and (5) the need for solutions 
that prevent adversaries from repairing penetrations. The 
approach is based on a transition metal ion solution within 
a  microsphere changing color irreversibly when the 
microsphere is ruptured. Investigators examine 3D printing 
of the microspheres as well as the spray coating 
formulation. The anticipated benefits of this work are 
passive, flexible, scalable, cost-effective TIEs with obvious 
and robust responses to tamper attempts. This results in 
more efficient and effective monitoring, as inspectors will 
require little or no additional equipment and will be able to 
detect tamper without extensive time-consuming visual 
examination. Applications can include custom TIEs 
(cabinets or equipment enclosures), spray-coating onto 
facility-owned items, spray-coating of walls or structures, 
spray-coatings of circuit boards, and 3D-printed seal 
bodies. The paper describes research to-date on the 
sensor compounds and microspheres.
Keywords: tamper-indicating enclosures; international nu-
clear safeguards
1. Introduction
Tamper-indicating enclosures (TIEs)1 are used in treaty ver-
ification regimes to detect access to an item of interest. 
Items of interest can include, but are not limited to, (1) in-
spectorate-owned equipment enclosures in which detect-
ing access is desired to ensure trust in information stored 
or processed within the enclosure and (2) facility-owned 
enclosures containing nuclear materials that have been 
measured by inspectors and require maintaining continuity 
of knowledge in the absence of the inspector. Current de-
ployed TIEs typically fall within three categories. The first 
are materials that an inspector will primarily visually inspect 
for signs of unauthorized access, such as the ubiquitous 
anodized aluminium enclosures that the IAEA deploys with 
the RMSA fiber loop seal, the NGSS surveillance system, 
legacy surveillance systems, and other monitoring equip-
ment. The second category are active electronic methods/
materials that continuously monitor the volume for signs of 
unauthorized access, such as the conductive foil within 
the EOSS fiber loop seal and the fiber mesh embedded in 
the enclosure of the NGSS. The third category are exter-
nally deployed indicators of penetration or access to mate-
rials, such as eddy current or imaging devices. Note that 
both the second and third category also require visual in-
spection. The limitations to these three categories are the 
subjective and time-consuming process of visually in-
specting surfaces, the inability to deploy an active ap-
proach in some situations because of batteries or because 
of environmental conditions or facility requirements, and 
the limited materials able to be analysed by eddy current 
and potential inability to bring external equipment into a fa-
cility. Further, some approaches rely more on post-mortem 
analysis rather than in-situ verification.
The existing toolkit for TIEs is limited regarding the com-
plex issues involved, and many technologies are old which 
may leave them more vulnerable. Simple visual approach-
es capable of high detection sensitivity have not received 
adequate research and development, although applica-
tions already exist that could benef it from such 
a  capabil i ty. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) 
1 Note that TIEs are essentially volumetric seals. As such, they must have an in-
tegrity and identity element. The integrity element (tamper-indicating) is the 
thrust of this work. The identity element will be addressed separately.
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recognizes these limitations and is developing “bleeding” 
materials (analog of visually obvious colorful bruised skin 
that doesn’t heal) that provide inspectors the ability to 
readily recognize using simple visual observation that pen-
etration into the material has been attempted without pro-
viding adversaries the ability to repair damage. Such mate-
rial can significantly enhance the current capability for 
TIEs, used to support treaty verification regimes.
SNL’s approach is research and development of cargo-
loaded microspheres embedded in 3D-printed structures 
or spray-coated onto existing surfaces, that when penetrat-
ed or tampered, cause an irreversible color change that is 
visually obvious1. Work comprises the following general 
tasks: (1) sensor and microsphere development and optimi-
zation (i.e., intensity of response, surface area of response, 
and microsphere composition, size, wall thickness, rupture 
point), (2) integration of transition metal-loaded micro-
spheres into 3D-printed, spray-coated, or moulded geome-
tries, and (3) testing and evaluation of prototypes, including 
environmental and industrial considerations. The anticipat-
ed benefits of this work are passive, flexible, scalable, cost-
effective TIEs with obvious and robust responses to tamper 
attempts. These responses result in more efficient and ef-
fective monitoring as inspectors will require little or no addi-
tional equipment and will be able to detect tampering with-
out extensive time-consuming visual examination. 
Applications can include custom TIEs (cabinets or equip-
ment enclosures), spray-coating onto facility-owned items, 
spray-coating of walls or structures, spray-coatings of cir-
cuit boards, and 3D-printed seal bodies.
Figure 1: General schematic of R&D concept. A two-phase material consisting of a sensing polymer and transition-metal encapsulated 
microspheres are 3D-printed or spray-coated on to a unique geometry. Upon tampering, the microspheres rupture and the two sensor 
components interact to form an irreversible visible color change.
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2. R&D of sensor compounds
Transition metal complexes consist of a transition metal 
center derived from a metal salt (e.g. FeCl3) and an organic 
molecule. The combination of these components can lead 
to dramatic and highly visible color changes which may be 
utilized for sensing application spaces. The initial approach 
for the goal of this project was to perform a scoping study 
with various 3d transition metals with one organic sensor 
(2,6-bis(10-methyl-benzimidazolyl)-4-hydroxypyridine, (HO-
Bip)) to establish a qualitative evaluation of color change.2,3 
Figure 2 presents these results along with the chemical 
structure of the sensor that was utilized.
Once the plausibility of the mechanism was confirmed, our 
second goal was to make a series of transition metal com-
plexes with a commercially available sensor. The com-
pound 5,6-epoxy-5,6-dihydro-[1,10]-phenanthroline (Ephen) 
was chosen as the sensor because it is cheap, colorless, 
and can be easily polymerized using various methods. The 
series of transition metal complexes were prepared via 
combining dilute solutions of the metal salts (CrCl3, 
Mn(OAc)3, FeCl2, FeCl3, CoCl2, CuCl2, NiCl2, and ZnCl2) with 
a dilute solution of Ephen in a 1:1 molar ratio. This ratio was 
chosen because it represents the minimum binding of the 
sensor to the metal salt. Two common solvents were inves-
tigated, methanol and dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO). These 
solvents were chosen as these are expected to have good 
penetration into epoxy-based polymeric materials while 
also allowing efficient solubility of the metal salts.
Figure 3 shows the results of mixing FeCl2, FeCl3, CoCl2, 
and CuCl2 with the sensor, Ephen. The other metal salts, 
CrCl3, Mn(OAc)3, NiCl2, and ZnCl2, did not yield an easily 
visible color change in either solvent. All solutions from 
Figure 3 have concentrations of 10 mM except the 
Figure 2: Qualitative scoping study results on 3d transition metal color changes with addition of organic sensor in methanol. All metal 
solutions get significantly darker, and many have a dramatic color change.
Figure 3: Colorless sensor solution in both methanol and DMSO (top); (a) addition of sensor solution to various metal salt solutions in 
a 1:1 molar ratio in methanol; (b) addition of sensor solution to various metal salt solutions in a 1:1 molar ratio in DMSO.
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Fe3+ (FeCl3), which had to be diluted to 2 mM. The transi-
tion metal complexes formed when mixing the Ephen sen-
sor with the Fe2+, Fe3+, and Co2+ solutions, all of which pro-
duced dramatic and visibly obvious color changes.
A more quantitative look at the color changes is shown in 
Figure 4. The solutions above were analyzed by UV-Visible 
absorbance spectroscopy and the results were plotted as 
a function of wavelength. The two most intense transitions 
occur with the Fe2+ and Co2+ ions. In the case of Fe2+ 
where the solution initially absorbs around 375 nm (visibly 
yellow), addition of the sensor dramatically shifts the ab-
sorbance to around 510 nm (visibly red). The Co2+ DMSO 
solution on the other hand begins as an intense, broad 
peak between 550 nm and 750 nm (visibly blue) and addi-
tion of the sensor produces a broad, weak absorbance 
around 500 nm. The other solutions do not produce such 
intense transitions.
The most visibly obvious color changes occurred in the 
solutions of Fe2+ and Fe3+ in both methanol and DMSO. 
The Co2+ transition was also visibly obvious but only oc-
curred in DMSO. The next goal is to physically incorporate 
these sensor molecules into a polymer backbone (Figure 
5) and to investigate the stability of these complexes over 
time in air, over heat, and in the presence of corrosive ma-
terials. Radiation testing will also be a major characteriza-
tion required for the safeguards application space, and the 
R&D in progress has been designed to utilize robust mate-
rials. More specifically, thermoset (cross-linked) materials 
are being prepared instead of thermoplastic materials, 
which can melt/degrade much quickly over time. The mo-
lecular structure of the thermoset materials will also aid in 
mitigating radiation damage.
Figure 4: UV-Visible absorbance spectroscopy of Fe2+ (top left), Fe3+ (top right), Co2+ (bottom left), and Cu2+ (bottom right) before and 
after addition of the sensor. The visible colors of the most intense peaks are labeled.
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3. Development of microspheres
A variety of wet chemistry microsphere synthetic methods 
have been developed in the literature in which capsule for-
mation is carried out in liquid medium, starting from a so-
lution, a liquid-in-liquid emulsion, or a solid-in-liquid sus-
pension.4 Template materials are often employed to direct 
the size and shape of the products during synthesis. One 
templating strategy involves the use of “soft” templates 
that are sensitive to synthesis parameters such as temper-
ature, pH, solvent polarity, etc. and have been demonstrat-
ed to form hollow nano- and microstructures composed of 
SiO2, carbons, polymers, metals, metal oxides, etc.
Our efforts focus on the use of emulsion templates. Emul-
sions are defined as two immiscible liquids (usually hydro-
phobic and hydrophilic pairs) where small droplets of one 
liquid are finely distributed within another continuous liquid 
phase. Emulsions can be oil-in-water (o/w) or water-in-oil 
(w/o), and surfactant compounds are often required to as-
semble at the interface of the two liquids to decrease the 
interfacial tension and increase thermodynamic stability. 
Precursor species for the microsphere shell self-assemble 
(often with the aid of co-surfactants) at the interface of the 
droplets and the continuous phase and the shell can sub-
sequently be formed through, for example, polymerization. 
This method can produce spheres in the nano- to micron- 
size regime. Cargo species of interest can be incorporated 
in one step into the microspheres through solubilization 
within the emulsion droplets.4,7
The requirements for the microsphere wall material are pri-
marily structural in nature, serving to mechanically contain 
the cargo compound. The structural properties of the mi-
crosphere must be commensurate with the strains expect-
ed for the particular application, i.e. they must be suffi-
ciently robust to withstand ‘normal’ environmental 
conditions yet able to rupture under tampering conditions. 
These properties are associated with the intrinsic tensile 
properties of the wall material itself, as well as the wall 
thickness and microsphere radius. Based on these crite-
ria, three types of candidate materials were down-selected 
for investigation and optimization: polymeric, siliceous, and 
polymer-silica core-shell composites.
Three different polymeric materials were studied: Urea-
Formamide (UF), Melamine-Urea-Formamide (MUF), and 
Poly(methyl methacrylate) (PMMA).5 The first two materials 
are copolymers prepared by o/w emulsion polymerization 
procedures, whereas the third entr y comprises 
a homopolymer microsphere prepared via an evaporation/
phase-separation procedure. Microspheres ranging in di-
ameter from 10 – 250 μm were synthesized and filled with 
the different mobile phase materials such as mineral oil 
and hexadecane.
Of the three materials studies, UF microspheres performed 
the best due to several properties: robust synthetic meth-
od that afforded the capsules in high yield, a relatively nar-
row size distribution, uniform particle surface properties, 
synthetically adjustable sizes across a wide range, and 
compatibility with all of the tested mobile phase materials. 
The above combination of desirable attributes was not ex-
hibited by either the MUF copolymer or PMMA micro-
spheres, in spite of other advantages such as higher ther-
mal stability and lower diffusivity in the case of MUF.
The development of a variety of microspheres with differ-
ent structural properties would provide a flexible selection 
of materials to coincide with the mechanical characteris-
tics/detection sensitivity of the corresponding tamper-indi-
cating device design. Siliceous systems were subsequent-
ly studied to impart increased mechanical strength into the 
microsphere walls.
Silica microcapsules were prepared by the acid-catalyzed 
hydrolysis of tetraethyl orthosilicate (TEOS) in a w/o emul-
sion.6 Stirring speed and method during the reaction had 
a large effect on the microsphere size and purity, as shown 
in Figure 7 below. Overhead stirring at 1000 rpm with 
Figure 5: General schematic of incorporation of organic sensor into polymeric material. Both UV-curable and heat-curable materials will 
be prepared and evaluated.
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a propeller impeller provided the best shear conditions to 
produce clean silica microspheres with a roughly trimodal 
size distribution of 0.5 - 1, 2 - 5, and 10 μm. Cu2+ and Fe3+ 
transition metal ions were successfully encapsulated as 
cargo in the aqueous mobile phase.
Crushing and grinding of these dried microspheres be-
tween two glass slides showed very little to no breakage, 
pointing towards the high mechanical strength of the silica 
microspheres compared to polymeric. It is well known, 
however, that silica microspheres contain micro- and mes-
oporosity,6 which is undesirable for long term containment 
of cargo molecules. Our next ef forts will focus on 
combining the low permeability of the polymers with the 
mechanical strength of the silica to form a core-shell poly-
mer-silica composite microsphere material.
4. Summary and Next Steps
SNL continues to develop a material that results in an ob-
vious, visual response (irreversible color change) upon 
tamper. The material will be 3D-printed for customizable 
inspection equipment, or spray-coated for application to 
facility-owned equipment. The material adds to the TIE 
toolbox, which is currently limited in options. R&D will con-
tinue on transition metals and microspheres, culminating in 
Figure 6: Video microscope screen capture images depicting intact (left) and ruptured (right) mineral oil-filled UF microspheres. The 
mechanical stimulus was exerted by a micro-manipulator tip pressing on the top plate of a microscope cover slip.
Figure 7: Scanning Electron Micrographs (SEMs) of silica microsphere products a) with magnetic stirring in a narrow glass bottle b) 
magnetic stirring in a wide glass jar c) overhead stirring in a glass round bottomed flask with a paddle impeller and d) overhead stirring in 
a plastic bottle with a propeller impeller.
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the integration of the transition metals and microspheres 
into 3D-printed and spray-coated prototypes. The proto-
types will undergo environmental testing upon fabrication. 
Future testing for durability and vulnerability will also be 
conducted.
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Abstract:
The long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel in geological 
repositories has introduced the need to develop new 
safeguards procedures, measures and technologies. For 
the proposed Swedish disposal process, the Continuity of 
Knowledge (CoK) of fue l dur ing transpor t f rom 
Oskarshamn and deposition of the same copper canisters 
at Forsmark is a challenging topic. Several Containment 
and Surveillance (C/S) measures could be used for this 
purpose; among them, the identification and authentication 
of copper canisters could be useful to trace canisters 
during transport. Ultrasonic techniques are used by 
authors to acquire unique fingerprints from each container. 
The ultrasonic amplitude response of a series of chamfers 
machined in the inner part of the copper lid can be used 
as a unique signature readable from outside the canister. 
In addition, canisters can be authenticated by investigating 
the welding area between the lid and the canister itself. 
The robustness of this approach is guaranteed by the 
angular matching between the identif ication and 
authentication fingerprints to produce a  third unique 
fingerprint, more reliable than the other two. Several 
experimental tests are performed to validate the approach 
and optimize the design of a device for the acquisition of 
ultrasonic fingerprints. A potential implementation of this 
device within the Swedish disposal process is also 
studied. The acquisition of ultrasonic references could be 
carried out af ter canisters’ f inal machining at the 
encapsulation plant and the process could be completely 
automated. The reduced cost of realization and its ease of 
use are the main advantages of the method. However, the 
machining of chamfers on copper lids requires the 
introduction of further steps in the manufacturing process 
of containers.
Keywords: ultrasound, identification, authentication, cop-
per canisters.
1. Introduction
The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repos-
itories introduces the need to revise safeguards approach-
es for a safe and secure handling of the fuel [1]. In 2011 the 
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. (SKB) 
submitted an application for the construction of a long-
term geological repository in Forsmark (Sweden). The SKB 
method for final disposal is based on a multi-barrier sys-
tem: copper canisters with iron inserts are used to host 
fuel assemblies; the bentonite clay is then used to cover 
canisters once deposited in tunnels and the bedrock iso-
lates canisters from human-beings and the environment 
for thousands of years. The spent nuclear fuel coming 
from nuclear power plants will be stored for a period in 
pools at the Central Interim Storage Facility (Clab) in Os-
karshamn. Then fuel assemblies will be dried and inserted 
in copper canisters with iron inserts at the encapsulation 
plant (that will be built next to the Clab). Canisters are big 
cylinders, about 5 m high and 1 m in diameter with a lid 
and a tube welded together by Friction Stir Welding (FSW). 
After the encapsulation of the fuel, copper canisters will be 
placed in transport casks and temporarily stored before 
being shipped to the final repository in Forsmark (Figure 1). 
At this facility, canisters will be reloaded to a deposition 
machine in the underground central area and then the 
canisters will be deposited in tunnels, later backfilled and 
sealed with a concrete plug. A total amount of 6,000 can-
isters will be deposited underground with an average of 
one canister per day, over roughly 40 years [2]. The Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model integrated 
safeguards approach for geological repositories foresee 
that Containment and Surveillance (C/S) measures should 
be applied to guarantee Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of 
spent nuclear fuel during storage and transport of copper 
canisters [3].
Identification of copper canisters for spent nuclear fuel: 
the ultrasonic method
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Since in Sweden the encapsulation plant and the geolog-
ical repository are not located on the same site safe-
guards approaches defined by the IAEA should be adapt-
ed to ensure CoK throughout the handling chain of the 
copper canisters. Surveillance systems could be used in-
side facilities to monitor the flow of spent nuclear fuel, 
while seals applied on transport casks could guarantee 
the identity of canisters during the transport from the en-
capsulation plant to the geological repository. However, 
in case of failure of one of the two measures, the identifi-
cation of copper canisters by a  unique tag could be 
adopted to recover CoK. Tagging devices should give 
a unique identifier to each canister (identification finger-
print) and return evidence of falsification attempts (au-
thentication fingerprint). External engraving of canisters 
should be avoided because it could trigger a corrosion 
process. Moreover, according to geometrical features, 
the minimum copper thickness to assure the stability of 
canisters’ structure is 50 mm. The majority of conven-
tional tagging devices used to identify uniquely nuclear 
items are analysed in [4] to see to what extent they could 
be adopted in the case of copper canisters. As a result, 
even if the identification of canisters could be realized 
with different methods, such as Reflective Particle Tags 
(RPT), ultrasonic methods or Tungsten-based Identifiers, 
the verification of authenticity is complex since it should 
be accomplished by techniques which analyse intrinsic 
properties of a canister. The ultrasonic method seems to 
be the only one able to identify and authenticate copper 
canisters. A description of this method for copper canis-
ters identification and authentication is reported in the 
paper, discussing advantages and disadvantages for 
a potential implementation in the Swedish system for final 
disposal.
2. The ultrasonic method
Ultrasound constitutes pressure-waves which can propa-
gate across a  specimen and are reflected whenever 
a discontinuity is encountered, i.e. a boundary between 
means of different acoustic impedances. At the interface 
between air and copper, for example, since the acoustic 
impedance mismatch is large, a couplant, such as water, 
is necessary to allow the transmission of the ultrasonic 
beam in copper. Canisters for spent nuclear fuel are 
made of copper to provide safety during handling and 
emplacement of the fuel in the repository and also to en-
sure isolation from the biosphere for thousands of years. 
Ultrasonic non-destructive testing is used to check the 
integrity of copper canisters and also the quality of the 
weld between lid and tube after the encapsulation of the 
fuel. However, the investigation of canisters by ultrasound 
could also be adopted for the acquisition of a unique 
identifier from each container. Ultrasonic techniques for 
reading bolt seals with artificial cavities applied on nucle-
ar casks deposited in underwater and dry storages have 
been used in the nuclear field for twenty years. In the 
case of copper canisters for spent nuclear fuel, the ultra-
sonic method for the identification and authentication of 
each container is based on the acquisition of two finger-
prints by ultrasound.
The identification signature is created by machining a se-
ries of chamfers machined in the inner surface of the 
canister’s lid where the copper thickness is greater than 
50 mm. Chamfers are arranged around the lid circumfer-
ence creating a unique code for each canister, readable 
by rotating a transducer as placed in Figure 2. The ultra-
sonic probe is kept inclined, in order to maintain the 
probe perpendicular to chamfer surfaces to obtain reflec-
tions according to Snell’s law. Whenever a chamfer is de-
tected, an echo is received by the probe and values of 
amplitude and time of flight are collected. By a 360º rota-
tion of the probe around the lid circumference, a unique 
code, strictly related to chamfers’ position, can be ac-
quired. In particular, the ultrasonic amplitude response of 
the chamfers represents an identification fingerprint for 
each copper canister. Acquiring this signature can be ac-
complished by immersion testing with water and the 
probe could be rotated automatically with a motor re-
motely controlled.
Figure 1. The spent fuel transfers in the Swedish system for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
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Figure 2: Ultrasonic investigation of chamfer (circled in green) 
machined in the inner part of the copper canisters’ lid. V1 and V2 
are the velocities of sound in water and copper respectively while 
α1 and α2 are the angles of incidence and transmission of the 
ultrasonic beam (red arrow).
The geometry of chamfers should be defined, on the one 
hand, to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio of the ultrason-
ic investigation and, on the other, to not affect the copper 
canisters’ geometry too much. For this purpose, simula-
tions and experimental tests on a laboratory mock-up have 
been carried out. As reported in [5] the acquisition of 
chamfers’ amplitude response was carried out on a ¼ 
scaled version of the copper lid with chamfers arranged 
around the circumference. The immersion test with an in-
clined probe, rotating 360º around the mock-up, con-
firmed the possibility of acquisition of an ultrasonic 
amplitude echo, whose variation is correlated to chamfers 
position.
Afterwards, results of simulations with CIVA software [6], 
revealed that the best compromise to meet all the require-
ments is a 10 mm wide chamfer with an inclination of 55º. 
This solution involves removing only 4.3 g of copper out of 
the full-sized 708 kg lid. Moreover, this chamfer length will 
ensure a good signal-to-noise ratio in the ultrasonic in-
spection also when varying the probe inclination, and in 
case of temperature variations in the water used for the 
immersion test. Temperature changes, in fact, affect the 
velocity of sound in medium and as a result, the ultrasonic 
investigation itself. While in copper these variations are 
negligible, in water the velocity of sound fluctuates from 
1403 m/s at 0°C up to a maximum of 1555 m/s at 74°C 
with a percent variation of about 11% [7]. According to the 
Swedish design criteria, the maximum temperature of the 
canisters’ outer surface is around 100°C. The CIVA simula-
tions show that 10 mm wide chamfers can be clearly dis-
tinguished from the rest of the lid even in varying tempera-
tures as shown in Figure 3. The echo amplitude of the 
chamfer 10 mm wide (green curve) is higher than without 
chamfers (blue curve). Therefore, in a range of tempera-
tures between 5°C and 100°C, a chamfer 10 mm wide can 
be detected with a good margin: as shown in Figure 3 the 
amplitude acceptance threshold at 0.04 (red line) is 10 
times bigger than the maximum amplitude without cham-
fers. In case of inspection with water temperatures below 
7°C, chamfers can be discriminated as well, but the signal-
to-noise ratio is lower than in the case of inspections with 
higher water temperature.
Figure 3: Simulation of the ultrasonic amplitude response acquired by the investigation of lid with (green curve) and without (blue curve) 
a chamfer 10 mm wide, considering a temperature variation from 0°C to 100°C. The red curve represents the acceptance threshold 
above which a chamfer 10 mm wide is well discriminated from the case with no chamfer.
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The angular extension of chamfers is another important pa-
rameter which can impact on canister’s geometry. The 
unique reflection realized by chamfers arranged around the 
lid circumference should be optimized in order to reduce the 
amount of copper to be removed. As a consequence, the 
early idea of a binary code with at least 13 chamfers and 
a reference for the identification of about 6,000 containers 
has been replaced with another coding. The new solution 
(Figure 4) splits the lid circumference into four imaginary 
sections 27º wide representing thousands, hundreds, tens 
and units. Each division is in turn divided into nine slots, 
which may or may not host a chamfer inclined 55º, 10 mm 
wide and with an angular extension of 3º. In this way, de-
pending on which slot of each section is occupied by the 
chamfer, it is possible to give a unique ID number to a can-
ister with only four chamfers plus the reference.
Figure 4: Proposed coding for chamfers to uniquely identify 
a copper canister (ID 4623).
To conclude, the identification of canisters is could be real-
ized by chamfers machined on the lids inner surface, read-
able from outside by an ultrasonic probe. Nevertheless, 
the code created by chamfers could be duplicated and 
then another solution should be implemented to verify at-
tempts of falsification. For this purpose, taking advantage 
of the ultrasonic transducer already implemented in the 
identification concept, a method to verify the canister’s au-
thenticity is developed.
In contrast to the identification fingerprint, the authentica-
tion signature is an intrinsic property of each copper canis-
ter. After the fuel assemblies have been encapsulated, the 
copper lid is welded onto the tube by Friction Stir Welding 
(FSW). A rotating tool penetrates between the two surfac-
es, heats the material and creates a joint [8]. According to 
the geometry design, two faces of the lid lean against the 
tube: at the end of the welding process, only one of them 
is welded to the tube and the other represents a gap be-
tween the lid and the tube. This discontinuity can be de-
tected by an ultrasonic transducer as placed in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Ultrasonic investigation of the welding area between 
lid and tube of a copper canister. The probe is kept at a fixed 
height “h”.
The ultrasonic amplitude response changes according to the 
variations of the gap height all around the lid circumference. 
Preliminary studies on copper flanges, i.e. slices of a copper 
lid already welded onto the tube, demonstrates the feasibility 
of the method: ultrasonic echoes from the internal gap and 
external wall surfaces have been acquired with a good signal-
to-noise ratio using a 10 MHz immersion transducer [9]. After-
wards, experimental tests are carried out on full scale welded 
lids at the SKB’s Canister Laboratory in Oskarshamn (Swe-
den). For this purpose, an ad hoc acquisition system proto-
type was designed. The reader, i.e. the device used to read 
authentication fingerprints, is made up by three steel arms, 
a motor devoted to the probe movement and a rotating bar to 
keep the transducer perpendicular to surfaces to be investi-
gated. Signals are transmitted and received by an electronic 
module which is connected to another board for the control of 
the motor and power supply. Results of investigations are then 
processed and displayed on a computer [10]. The set-up of 
measurements for the investigation of welded copper lid is 
shown in Figure 6. Several measurements have been carried 
out, changing the position of the reader above the lid and the 
probe height in order to verify the repeatability of measure-
ments and inspect a wide area of the welded region. Two time 
windows are used to acquire the maximum amplitude echo 
between the internal gap and the external wall.
Figure 6: Set-up of measurements on copper samples: the reader 
for the scanning of the welding area is centred on the lid and 
signals are transmitted/received to/from the ultrasonic transducer 
by a control box connected to a computer for the processing and 
display of acquisitions.
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After a complete rotation of the probe, the ultrasonic am-
plitude responses are collected and analysed. In Figure 7 
is a display of the ultrasonic amplitude response of the in-
ternal gap (in blue) and the external wall (in red) on rotation 
angle of the probe. The two curves are quite fluctuating 
and present interesting peculiarities which can be unique 
to each container. However, the uniqueness of the welding 
area should be verified undertaking a statistical analysis of 
a consistent number of samples.
The ultrasonic method is based on the acquisition of ultra-
sonic-amplitude responses of chamfers (identification) and 
welded regions (authentication). While the first can discrim-
inate each canister from another, the second helps to veri-
fy the authenticity of each canister. However, duplication of 
both fingerprints could make it difficult to ascertain the au-
thenticity of a given canister. Therefore, we introduce 
a third fingerprint to our method to increase the reliability. 
The new fingerprint is simply realized connecting the inter-
section points between identification and authentication 
fingerprints. In this way, as shown in Figure 8, if the angular 
matching between the two fingerprints (blue line for the 
identification and yellow line for the authentication) is not 
the same as in the reference, it is possible to detect anom-
alies and demonstrate potential counterfeit canisters. 
A patent has been filed for both the identification and au-
thentication approaches [11].
3. Potential implementation in the Swedish 
system
The adoption of the ultrasonic system could be extremely 
important in the case of failures of the other two main C/S 
measures: the monitoring devices and seals applied on 
transport casks. The encapsulation plant and the geologi-
cal repository could be considered as black boxes where 
additional C/S measures are not necessary. However, dur-
ing transport of copper canisters between the two sites, 
the use of dual C/S measures is recommended. Therefore, 
the implementation of an additional system to identify and 
uniquely authenticate each canister could be considered 
as a useful way to recover CoK in case of losses and not 
as a routine measure. The introduction of a unique identifi-
er should also be combined with other techniques to verify 
the integrity of the canister and the fuel inside. This section 
describes how the ultrasonic method could be included 
within the Swedish system for final disposal.
The identification and authentication fingerprints, to be 
used as references, could be acquired at the encapsula-
tion plant, stored in a database and then verified with other 
measured fingerprints, only in case of necessity. In gener-
al, performing verification measurements to assess the fuel 
and the canisters’ integrity at the geological repository is 
not desirable, but since this should not be a periodic pro-
cedure, it could be useful to recover CoK using ultrasonic 
methods in case of the failure of other C/S measures. Ul-
trasonic fingerprints could be acquired at the encapsula-
tion plant and a reference could be stored for each con-
tainer. At the geological repository, these fingerprints could 
be verified in case of necessity and acquired responses 
could then be compared with references. At the encapsu-
lation plant, after the encapsulation of the fuel, canisters 
are welded and ultrasonic and radiographic tests are then 
performed on each container to verify the quality of the 
weld. At this stage, reference fingerprints could be ac-
quired. In particular, an ad hoc system could be developed 
to acquire automatically a reference signature from each 
Figure 7: Ultrasonic amplitude response acquired rotating the transducer around the copper sample circumference with fixed height h. The 
red line is the amplitude response of the external wall while the blue line is the amplitude response of the internal gap.
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canister. Ultrasonic measurements could be performed in 
the same room as the radiographic inspection of welds. 
A section view of the possible ultrasonic reader placed 
above a canister is shown in Figure 9. The device can be 
seen as an optimized version of prototypes already devel-
oped for laboratory tests. This new system includes a cy-
lindrical box which hosts a tank for water, plus a motor and 
a rotating bar which supports two transducers (highlighted 
in yellow in Figure 9). One transducer is kept perpendicular 
to the welding area to acquire the authentication fingerprint 
and the other transducer is inclined according to Snell’s 
law to receive echoes and furthermore to generate the 
identification code produced by the chamfers. The speed 
of the motor can be adjusted to optimize the acquisition of 
Figure 8: Comparison between a real fingerprint and a copy: the differences in angular matching between the identification (blue curve) 
and authentication (yellow curve) fingerprints can be detected analysing the trend of the third fingerprint (in red). 
Figure 9: Section view of a CAD design of the ultrasonic reader device placed above a canister. Two probes (highlighted in yellow) rotate 
around the lid circumference to acquire the identification and the authentication fingerprints.
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signals and different inspections can be performed chang-
ing the transducer height for the collection of a  larger 
amount of data.
All ultrasonic measurements could be accomplished with-
out the involvement of an operator: the reader system 
could be put in place by a crane or robotic arm and auto-
matically centred on the lid (Figure 10). Once in place, wa-
ter can be poured on the external concave of the lid and 
the ultrasonic immersion testing could be launched. After 
a complete rotation of both probes, the two curves are 
registered, stored in a memory card and sent wirelessly to 
a control station. The processing of signals for the defini-
tion of the third fingerprint can be done at the post-pro-
cessing of data. At the end of the inspection, water will be 
pumped away from the lid.
All the electronics useful for the control of the motor and 
the transmission/reception of signals could be developed 
in an embedded version to fit inside a cabinet which could 
be placed in the same room as the measurements set-up 
(far from radiation emitted by the spent fuel inside the can-
ister). All the reading processes could be monitored by 
surveillance devices and a complete rotation of transduc-
ers could be completed in a few minutes. Differently from 
other identification methods, the ultrasonic method is easy 
to implement and use, since it works automatically without 
the need of operators. In addition the cost of signatures’ 
manufacturing is practically included in the canisters pro-
duction costs. However, the realization of unique configu-
rations of chamfers around copper lids involves the intro-
duction of an additional step within the manufacturing 
process of canisters.
In the case of verification of fingerprints at the geological 
repository, a portable version of the same reader could be 
developed to make an easy verification whenever it is 
required.
A State might require that canisters be retrieved from a re-
pository as a safety measure [12], as is the case for Swe-
den. Safeguards approaches have not been pre-deter-
mined for any retrieval scenarios. However, having 
a unique reference for each container could be useful to 
keep the CoK in case of retrieval, based on the hypothesis 
that the identification and authentication fingerprints would 
not be altered at that time, and there is knowledge availa-
ble to use the ultrasonic methods for the identification of 
the canisters.
4. Conclusions
The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel introduces new 
challenges in the field of nuclear safeguards. The transport 
of copper canisters with spent nuclear fuel from the en-
capsulation plant to the final repository, as planned in 
Sweden, requires the implementation of supplementary 
C/S measures, in addition to dual surveillance and sealing 
systems, to be used in case of CoK losses. The ultrasonic 
method for the identification and authentication of copper 
canister is a potential way to help the recovering of CoK if 
necessary. However, canister identification should be 
combined with other techniques to verify the fuel integrity 
in order to recover the CoK. This method is based on the 
ultrasonic acquisition of two fingerprints. The ultrasonic 
amplitude response of a series of chamfers machined 
around the lid’s inner surface could be used to generate 
an identification fingerprint. In addition, the ultrasonic am-
plitude response of the welding area between the copper 
lid and the canister can be used as an intrinsic fingerprint 
which authenticates each container since the ultrasonic 
amplitude response is only related to material properties 
and the welding process. Experimental tests were per-
formed to validate both concepts and our results con-
firmed expectations. We recommend that future tests be 
performed on a full-scale copper lid with chamfers already 
Figure 10: The ultrasonic acquisition of identification and authentication fingerprints could be performed in correspondence of the 
radiographic station for weld verification (in blue). On the left, the ultrasonic reader (in red) is lifted above the copper canister. On the right, 
a crane (in green) arranges the device on the canister.
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welded to a canister tube in order to validate the third fin-
gerprint described in Section 3. In fact, the angular match-
ing between the identification and authentication signals 
could realize a third unique signature, increasing the ro-
bustness and reliability of the whole method. The design of 
an ultrasonic reader has been presented and its use has 
been optimized to avoid the involvement of an operator 
during the acquisition of fingerprints. The proposed ver-
sion could be adopted within the encapsulation plant but 
a second version could be developed for the geological 
repository, by adapting of the one designed for the encap-
sulation plant.
5. Acknowledgements
This research has been accomplished by the Seals and 
Identification Lab (SILab) of the Joint Research Centre of 
the European Commission in Ispra in collaboration with the 
Department of Information engineering of the University of 
Florence. We would like to thank our colleagues from SKB 
for the copper samples provided to us for tests and all the 
expertise shared with us.
6. References
[1] af Ekenstam G.; Hildingsson L.; Fagerholm R.; An-
dersson C.; Elements of a Swedish Safeguards Policy 
for a Spent Fuel Disposal System; ESARDA Bulletin 
54; June 2018; pp.36-41.
[2] Hildingsson L.; Andersson C.; Fagerholm R.; Safe-
guards Aspects Regarding a Geological Repository 
in Sweden; IAEA Safeguards Symposium, Paper CN-
220-166; Swedish Radiation Safety Authority: Stock-
holm; Sweden; 2014.
[3] International Atomic Energy Agency: IAEA; Model In-
tegrated Safeguards Approach for a Spent Fuel En-
capsulation Plant; SG-PR-1305; ver. 1; 10 June 2010.
[4] Clementi C.; Littmann F.; Capineri L.; Comparison of 
Tagging Technologies for Safeguards of Copper Can-
isters for Nuclear Spent Fuel; Sensors 2018 18(4) 
929; March 2018. Available online (accessed on Sept 
28 2018): https://doi.org/10.3390/s18040929.
[5] Clementi C.; Littmann F.; Capineri L.; Andersson C.; 
Ronneteg U.; Ultrasonic Identification Methods of 
Copper Canisters for Final Geological Repository; 
ESARDA Bull. N.54; 2017, pp. 75–81.
[6] Ultrasonic Testing with Civa- Extende. Available on-
line (accessed on April 15 2019): http://www.extende.
com/ultrasonic-testing-with-civa.
[7] Engineering ToolBox, Speed of Sound in Water, 
2004. Available online (accessed on Nov 10, 2017): 
https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/sound-speed-
water-d_598.html.
[8] Stepinski T.; Engholm M.; Olofsson T.; Inspection of 
copper canisters for spent nuclear fuel by means of 
ultrasound Copper characterization, FSW monitoring 
with acoustic emission and ultrasonic imagin; Uppsa-
la University; Signals and Systems Department of 
Technical Sciences; Sweden; August 2009.
[9] Clementi C.; Capineri L.; Littmann F.; Innovative Meth-
od to Authenticate Copper Canisters Used for Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Based on the Ultrasonic Investigation of 
the Friction Stir Weld; IEEE Access 2017; Vol. 5; 
doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2694878.
[10] Clementi C Littmann F.; Capineri L.; Ultrasonic Inves-
tigation of the Welding Area of Copper Canisters for 
Spent Nuclear Fuel; ESARDA Bull. N.56; 2018; pp. 
19-27.
[11] Littmann F.; Ultrasonic identification and authentica-
tion of containers for hazardous materials; EP 
16166465; April 21; 2016.
[12] Mongello R; Finch R. J.; Baldwin G.; Safeguards Ap-
proaches for Geological Repositories: Status and 
Gap Analysis. Available online (accessed on Feb 02 
2019): https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 
280655578_Safeguards_Approaches_for_Geologi-
cal_Repositories_Status_and_Gap_Analysis.
63
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 58, June 2019
Abstract
The US, UK, Sweden and Norway have formed the Quad 
Nuclear Verification Partnership and have been working 
together as the ‘Quad’ to ensure non-nuclear weapon 
states (NNWS) and nuclear weapon states (NWS) 
collaborate to overcome the challenge of nuclear arms 
control verification. The Quad aims to complement and 
inform the work of other multinational initiatives such as the 
International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament 
Verification (IPNDV).
The initial engagement of the Quad was the development 
and execution of a  role-playing, in-field verification 
simulation, named LETTERPRESS. A  benefit of role-
playing events is the capacity they have to allow 
researchers to engage critically with a challenge from 
mult iple perspectives. This paper wi l l  introduce 
LETTERPRESS and the process the Quad followed to 
develop and execute the multilateral simulation. The paper 
will highlight the in-play objectives of the verification 
regime, the site hosting the on-site inspection, and the 
verification technologies and their roles with respect to the 
objectives. The paper will include lessons learned from 
LETTERPRESS and their contribution to a  successful 
monitoring result. The paper will conclude by highlighting 
the in-play success of a multilateral verification body and 
the ability of both NNWS and NWS to contribute to the 
verification process within LETTERPRESS.
Keywords: Quad, LETTERPRESS, multilateral, arms control
1. Introduction to the Quad
The Quad is a multilateral nuclear disarmament verification 
partnership bringing together representatives from two 
non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), Norway and Sweden, 
and two nuclear weapon states (NWS), the United States 
and United Kingdom. The Quad builds upon previous ex-
periences, such as the UK-Norway Initiative [1] and US-UK 
arms control exercises [2], to collaborate and explore tech-
nical and policy solutions to help solve verification and 
monitoring challenges related to nuclear disarmament. The 
Quad also aims to complement and inform the work of 
other multinational initiatives such as the International Part-
nership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) [3].
One objective of the Quad is to enhance and extend previ-
ous work by the Quad partners and investigate how NWS) 
and NWS may participate together to demonstrate how 
multilateral nuclear disarmament verification could work 
and be implemented in the real world. This objective di-
rectly supports Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Arti-
cle VI, Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures re-
lating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on gen-
eral and complete disarmament under strict and effec-
tive international control [4]. The key section of Article VI 
impacted by the Quad engagement is highlighted in bold. 
Complementarily, the engagement also impacts Article 
I and Article II of the NPT to provide assurance that disar-
mament activities can include effective international control 
without revealing or proliferating sensitive weapon design 
information.
2. Introduction to the LETTERPRESS 
Simulation
2.1 LETTERPRESS Scope and Objectives
LETTERPRESS was the name of the simulation executed 
in October 2017 at Royal Airforce (RAF) base Honington in 
the UK, and represented the first activity undertaken by 
the Quad. It included approximately 50 representatives 
from all four countries who acted as planners, i.e. for logis-
tics, simulation execution, support, and simulation evalua-
tion, and players, i.e. host and inspection team members. 
At a high-level, the exercise examined one on-site inspec-
tion activity, as part of a broader treaty regime, at an inter-
im storage facility. The fictitious site where the interim stor-
age facility was located was called Notinghon, and is 
represented in Figure 1. The in-play objective was to con-
firm the correctness and completeness of the host decla-
ration, and establish chain of custody (CoC) over treaty ac-
countable items (TAI) destined for dismantlement. There 
were confirmation measurements to confirm the authentic-
ity of the declared TAI, absence measurements to confirm 
the absence of undeclared TAIs at declared locations, and 
CoC measures, i.e. surveillance, tamper indicating devices 
and enclosures (TIDs/TIEs), and unique identifiers (UIDs) to 
maintain the integrity of equipment, facilities, and TAIs.
Highlights of the Quad Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control 
Research Initiative LETTERPRESS Simulation
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Out of play, the research objectives of LETTERPRESS 
were to evaluate technical options for collecting and ana-
lyzing treaty relevant information and data, and to explore 
the minimum information necessary for the inspectors to 
achieve their inspection objectives. Additionally, LETTER-
PRESS included learning objectives to immerse a diverse 
set of technical experts from the four countries into a real-
istic monitoring and verification scenario. Together, the 
participants would gain a greater appreciation for the chal-
lenges present in verification of nuclear arms control/re-
duction treaties, and to gain experience and knowledge to 
continue to work together in the future to address these 
challenges.
3. LETTERPRESS Treaty and Verification Regime
In order to achieve the stated learning objectives, it was 
important to develop a realistic scenario. Toward that end, 
the Quad partners pulled from previous and current trea-
ties and agreements, specifically New START, and lever-
aged the expertise of the partners in arms control, nonpro-
liferation and international safeguards. The following 
formed the foundation of the verification regime.
3.1 LETTERPRESS Background and High-Level 
Declarations
Two NWS agreed to a significant reduction in their respec-
tive stockpiles. As part of the significant reduction in nucle-
ar weapons, the two countries agreed to include the two 
neighboring NNWS to be part of the inspectorate tasked 
with confirming the technical aspects of the monitoring re-
gime. The ‘B5’, as called out in the scenario as the Treaty 
Accountable Item and referred to throughout this paper 
and shown in Figure 2, was represented by a WE177 
weapon case. The WE177 was a historical UK gravity 
bomb. As part of the agreement to this treaty, the following 
high-level declarations were made:
a) All B5s will be removed from the active stockpile over 
the lifetime of the treaty. The operationally deployed 
B5s will be reduced over time through the dismantle-
ment process.
b) B5s selected to enter the dismantlement process will 
be declared and transported from their respective op-
erational bases to the interim storage site where they 
will be stored until ready for dismantlement at the just-
in-time dismantlement facility.
c) B5s remaining operationally deployed may require re-
furbishment over the lifetime of the treaty. These items 
will be transported from their respective operational 
bases to the interim storage site where they will be 
stored until ready for refurbishment.
New START is a current nuclear arms control treaty be-
tween the US and Russia which limits each party’s strate-
gic delivery vehicles and warheads with an inspection pro-
tocol detailing the content, structure, and requirements for 
providing notif ications and declarations of treaty 
Figure 1: ‘Notinghon’, the interim storage facility that featured in LETTERPRESS, was just one declared site in the fictitious state. The site 
contained multiple locations and facilities.
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accountable items to each treaty partner [5]. Leveraging 
New START type notifications and declarations, a number 
of assumptions were made for LETTERPRESS with re-
spect to the protocol and agreement. These included:
a) Per the agreed protocol, there is an agreed number of 
inspections allowed per year at the interim storage site 
and the dismantlement facility.
b) The host country will provide post-departure and post-
arrival notifications of inter-site movement to all treaty 
partners no later than five days after the movement is 
complete.
c) The host country will notify the treaty partners of its in-
tent to send a batch of treaty accountable items, previ-
ously declared for dismantlement, from interim storage 
to the dismantlement facility.
d) The host country will provide only post-departure and 
post-arrival notifications of movement for B5s requiring 
refurbishment.
e) The inspecting party may request to initiate an on-site 
inspection af ter any number of notif ications of 
movement, or an intent to send items to the dismantle-
ment facility have been provided.
This last assumption served as the impetus for the LET-
TERPRESS exercise.
At a high-level, the verification activities simulated in LET-
TERPRESS were the following:
1. Upon arrival on-site, the inspectors confirmed CoC 
over a storage bunker serving as treaty monitored stor-
age for all B5s declared for dismantlement and which 
were initialized into the monitoring regime. They also 
confirmed CoC over a bunker where they performed 
agreed measurements and stored equipment.
2. Upon establishing CoC over the storage bunkers, the 
inspectors declared that they were ready to accept and 
initialize the B5(s) into the regime.
3. A confirmation measurement was performed on each 
declared B5 (to address the ‘correctness’ element of 
the protocol and confirm the declared treaty accounta-
ble item attributes).
Figure 2: A B5 bomb sits outside its container during the LETTERPRESS simulation. Inspectors (in white) and host personnel discuss the 
next step in the verification procedure.
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o An agreed UID was initialized and confirmed for each 
B5.
o An agreed confirmation measurement was per-
formed on each B5. It was radiation-based and con-
firmed an agreed set of attributes and compared 
against a trusted template. The trusted template was 
generated by performing a reference measurement 
on an active stockpile B5 declared on-site. Subse-
quent measurements were compared against that 
reference template.
4. As agreed in the protocol, the inspectors exercised 
their right to perform monitoring of items and activities 
at other declared locations at the site. Therefore, the in-
spectors requested to inspect a random storage bun-
ker declared as empty.
5. The inspectors performed an absence measurement 
on the container(s) to confirm lack of a radiation (neu-
tron) signature and noted visual observations (to ad-
dress the ‘completeness’ of the element of the 
protocol).
6. Inspectors performed the following CoC measures on 
the selected B5(s) transported to the dismantlement 
facility.
o The inspectors confirmed the UID of each B5 select-
ed for transport to the dismantlement facility.
o The inspectors installed agreed TIDs to secure the 
B5 and container during transport.
7. Upon arrival at the dismantlement facility, the inspec-
tors confirmed the authenticity and integrity of the CoC 
measures and per fo rmed a  reconf i rmat ion 
measurement.
o The host presented each B5 which was transport-
ed from the interim storage site to the dismantlement 
facility.
o Inspectors reconfirmed the UID of each B5.
o Inspectors performed confirmation measurements 
for each B5. The agreed confirmation measurements 
were radiation-based and confirmed an agreed set 
of attributes and compare against a trusted template 
(agreed to in the protocol).
Once confirmation measurements were complete and 
successfully passed/matched, the item(s) were released by 
the inspectors and processed through dismantlement. At 
this point, LETTERPRESS was complete.
3.2 Rights, Responsibilities and Protocol
LETTERPRESS simulated an on-site inspection, where the 
role of the inspection team was to carry out an inspection 
at Notinghon to verify that the declaration made about the 
status and location of a number of B5 nuclear bombs was 
‘correct’ and ‘complete’. The role of the host team was to 
help facilitate the inspection team in their mission on site, 
while also ensuring the site security and national security 
are not compromised. Together these formed the over-
arching obligations of the inspection and host teams re-
spectively and the biggest challenge in the development 
and execution of a robust verification regime: how can the 
inspection team collect sufficient data to confirm correct-
ness and completeness while the host team protects sen-
sitive, classified, or information otherwise outside of the 
treaty agreement?
Within LETTERPRESS, the completeness objective was 
simulated by allowing the inspection team to randomly se-
lect a facility bunker and perform an absence measure-
ment to confirm the absence of a B5 to provide confi-
dence that undeclared weapons are not stockpiled or 
deployed on-site. This activity is captured in Figure 3. This 
seemingly simple activity raised a number of questions 
and posed many challenges that, while not solved in LET-
TERPRESS, helped the Quad partners to better under-
stand the techniques and challenges in this area.
A few simple examples of challenges are highlighted in the 
context of managed access, the host process to control 
site access and protect information. These include, defin-
ing the criteria for selecting inspection locations, how to 
lockdown the site, and the immediacy of allowing inspec-
tions versus protecting facility operations that cannot be 
stopped immediately. These examples reinforce the high-
level LETTERPRESS objective to explore the minimum in-
formation necessary for the inspectors to achieve their in-
spection objectives. The project team worked hard to 
create a balance to simulate the realistic facility and on-site 
inspection constraints at a nuclear weapon facility and the 
flexibility to evaluate technologies and complete monitoring 
activities to explore what and how much information give 
inspectors adequate confidence towards their inspection 
objectives.
Within LETTERPRESS, the correctness objective was sim-
ulated through attribute and template measurements on 
declared B5s, both active stockpile and those declared for 
dismantlement. The confirmation technologies used in-
cluded the UK-Norway Initiative Information Barrier (UKNI 
IB) with a high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector and the 
Trusted Radiation Identification System (TRIS). The use of 
TRIS to generate a trusted reference is shown in Figure 4. 
To facilitate these measurements, the treaty required the 
declaration of certain details about the basic design and 
stockpile characteristics of the B5. In the end, the declara-
tions stated that all B5s contained plutonium below 
a threshold ratio of Pu-240 to Pu-239, and all B5s exhibit-
ed a very similar radiological profile. Together these decla-
rations met the technical needs for the UKNI IB and TRIS 
respectively, and allowed the Quad to evaluate the correct-
ness objective.
67
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 58, June 2019
Figure 3: Radiation detection Equipment (RDE) is used to measure the local neutron count rate within a storage bunker that had been 
declared not to contain any B5 bombs as part of the absence verification procedure on a randomly selected location.
Figure 4: The Trusted Radiation Identification System (TRIS) is used to ensure the radiation profile of a B5 bomb is similar to a ‘template’ 
profile of another B5, collected earlier.
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In the TRIS concept of operations, the initial trusted tem-
plate would be generated on the first measured active 
stockpile B5 and use that template to compare all other 
B5s; if the template matched then it was declared a B5 
and was initialized into the regime. From a policy perspec-
tive, this raised a number of interesting issues. First, it re-
quired the declaration of additional information about the 
B5 design and overall stockpile, e.g. the similarity of all 
B5s. If the profile of the B5s was not consistent throughout 
the stockpile, then the weapon owner could be forced to 
declare sub-populations upfront, or ensure the profile was 
sufficiently broad to cover all differences between B5s. 
The monitoring of how those sub-populations are used 
over time could impact operational security, while an over-
ly broad profile could impact inspector confidence in the 
correctness of the initial declaration. Additionally, a tem-
plate by itself does not directly relate to a weapon system. 
Since the spectrum from a template is never seen, it must 
initially be combined with an alternate method to gain con-
fidence that the spectrum is truly from a declared weapon, 
e.g. using agreed attributes of a declared weapon. Lastly, 
the trusted template now needs to be protected and con-
trolled throughout the timeframe of the treaty. This creates 
additional CoC requirements, e.g. key management and 
dual containment, from the inspector perspective and in-
formation and physical security requirements for the host. 
In total, there are technical and policy challenges which 
exist in the use of TRIS, and templates in general. Howev-
er, the huge benefit of templates is that, assuming a trust-
ed template, the inspector can have high confidence in the 
authenticity of all other weapons declared to be of the 
same type, that match the reference template.
In the context of exploring the minimal amount of informa-
tion necessary for inspectors to achieve their objectives, 
and in this case for the host to ensure protection of sensitive 
information, these discussions and the ultimate simulation of 
TRIS as a warhead confirmation tool proved valuable.
LETTERPRESS also focused on CoC, the process to 
maintain confidence in the integrity of inspection facilities, 
treaty accountable items, i.e. B5s, and inspection equip-
ment. Issues that were explored included how to maintain 
confidence in the above between inspection visits, while 
on-site performing confirmation measurements and intra-
site movements, and inter-site movements from Notinghon 
to the dismantlement facility. Technologies trialed during 
LETTERPRESS included an applied UID using the reflec-
tive particle tag (RPT) and an intrinsic UID produced using 
the eddy current tagging (ECT) system. In addition, the 
Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) active loop seal 
and passive adhesive seals were applied to maintain con-
trol over monitored areas. Video cameras were notional.
Figure 5: An applied Unique Identifier (UID) Tag is applied to the container of the B5 to ensure the individual item can be accounted for 
and tracked throughout the treaty lifetime.
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As an interesting note, during the planning process, there 
was significant discussion regarding the use of TRIS and 
the potential impact on the quality and quantity of informa-
tion that must be included in the declaration. One of the 
early ideas was to utilize TRIS as a CoC tool. In this way, 
a template would be generated on a B5 declared for dis-
mantlement prior to it leaving Notinghon. Upon arrival at 
the dismantlement facility, the template would be recon-
firmed, and the inspectors would have confidence in the 
integrity of the B5 through transport and prior to it entering 
the dismantlement process. This process would be re-
peated for every B5 declared for dismantlement. With this 
concept of operations, there is no need to generate and 
store, for a long period of time, a trusted template because 
it was only valid through the transportation process. Addi-
tionally, there was no need to declare any information 
about the B5, e.g. the similarity of all B5 radiological pro-
files, to utilize TRIS because each B5 would have its own 
unique template. Discussions regarding the use of TRIS as 
either a CoC tool or warhead confirmation tool proved val-
uable to the team and highlighted a number of lessons 
learned surrounding the impact of technology on policy. 
As mentioned earlier, ultimately the decision was made to 
ut i l ize TRIS as a  warhead conf i rmation tool in 
LETTERPRESS.
In LETTERPRESS, the combination of declarations and 
CoC allowed the inspectors the opportunity to track de-
clared items over time and between locations, and to 
know when monitored areas were accessed outside of in-
spector’s presence. There were two techniques trialed to 
review data and ensure data security. The first was 
through physical security, and the second through crypto-
graphic security. In the former, data from digital cameras 
used to confirm CoC seals was collected on secure digital 
memory cards (SD cards), stored in a tamper-indicating 
enclosure (TIE), and transported outside of the secure area 
under inspector visual observation and host control, as 
prescribed by applied host managed access. Upon re-
ceipt in the inspection station, the data was uploaded and 
manually reviewed. In the latter case, data was protected 
by cryptographic keys on the CoCIM, used to secure 
doors to monitored areas, and TRIS, as a confirmation 
tool. In each case, the integrity of the seal and template 
could be verified in-situ. The importance of data review for 
CoC and for maintaining overall confidence in the regime 
was made very clear throughout LETTERPRESS. Howev-
er, the difficulty and time-consuming nature of physical se-
curity and manual review of data was also made very 
clear. And contrary to the comments on physical security 
and manual review, the immediate confirmation of crypto-
graphic data was highlighted as a huge benefit to the 
inspectors.
At the end of LETTERPRESS, the importance and frustra-
tion of CoC was mentioned nearly unanimously by the 
players. In the context of the amount of information 
necessary for inspectors to achieve their objectives, this 
was a significant lesson. The LETTERPRESS team ex-
plored the balance between how much data is enough to 
have confidence but not overwhelm the inspectors and sy-
phon precious time and resources away from the inspec-
tion to data review.
4. Lessons Learned
The impact of the lessons learned, and the experience 
gained will last well beyond LETTERPRESS. In conclusion, 
a few of the high-level and impactful lessons learned are 
provided here.
• The inspection objectives of confirming correctness and 
completeness are complementary. In the context of use-
ful information and achieving inspection objectives, the 
combination of correctness and completeness may pro-
vide greater overall confidence while minimizing the 
amount of information required by the inspector or re-
leased by the host. Thinking of these as a system helped 
to identify key control points and allowed all parties to 
better understand the impact of any one action, deci-
sion, or activity on the host and inspector, and in the 
context of minimization of information.
• The technologies were instrumental in the success of 
LETTERPRESS. The implementation of the technologies 
within their defined roles were selected to trial various 
techniques and capabilities of interest to the Quad part-
ners. Each technology also highlighted potential oppor-
tunities and challenges regarding its use in a verification 
regime similar to LETTERPRESS. One aspect that was 
left out of LETTERPRESS was equipment authentica-
tion. This was recognized as a key part of technology 
deployment but was not on the critical path with respect 
to Quad learning objectives for LETTERPRESS.
• The implementation of managed access within LETTER-
PRESS highlighted the challenges of performing verifica-
tion activities at a treaty partner nuclear weapon facility. 
Host operation of all equipment and data, and the use of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) for inspectors, in 
conjunction with continuous escorting, within monitored 
areas highlight the scope of managed access in LET-
TERPRESS. These examples were implemented within 
LETTERPRESS to evaluate the impact of managed ac-
cess and information protection without the need to fo-
cus ont guards, gates and guns. Output from LETTER-
PRESS made it clear that managed access has a big 
impact on both inspector and host in positive and nega-
tive ways.
• LETTERPRESS highlighted technical and policy implica-
tions stemming from decisions made during the exer-
cise/simulation regime development effort. Technical so-
lutions require certain information to be successful. This 
information may directly impact policy decisions regard-
ing the quality and quantity of information that may need 
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to be released regarding a country’s nuclear stockpile 
and weapon characteristics. The regime development 
process must be considered from a system point of view 
to capture the cost-benefit analysis and achieve the de-
sired balance between verification and information 
protection.
5. References
[1] UKNI Collaboration; The United Kingdom – Norway 
Initiative on the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dis-
mantlement; UKNI Presentation, NPT PrepCom; Vi-
enna, May 2012. https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/28425/20120503_npt_prepcom_
presentation.pdf.
[2] NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, 
UK Atomic Weapons Establishment; Joint U.S. – U.K. 
Report on Technical Cooperation for Arms Control; 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/10/f37/
Joint_USUK_Report_FINAL%5B1%5D.PDF; May 
2015.
[3] Hinderstein, C; International Partnership for Nuclear 
Disarmament Verification: A  foundation for future 
arms reductions; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
74(5), 2018.
[4] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT), https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nucle-
ar/npt/text. Accessed May 1, 2019.
[5] U.S. Department of State; New START; https://www.
state.gov/t/avc/newstart/; Accessed May 1, 2019.

The International Journal of Nuclear Safeguards 
and Non-Proliferation
50TH ANNIVERSARY      
June 2019 Bulletin No.58
K
J-B
B
-19-058-E
N
-N
